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DECLINE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:
TIME TO OVERRULE MAPP V. OHIO?
John G. Miles, Jr. *
I. INTRODUCTION
In reviewing the record of the Supreme Court over the past several
years, it is difficult to state any broad generalizations concerning its
decisions on issues involving a conflict between governmental and indi-
vidual interests. On the one hand, the Court has written a wide range of
opinions which have effectually reduced the authority of the government
to regulate the lives of its citizens.' It has also strengthened defense
rights at key stages of criminal prosecution 2 and has significantly ex-
panded due process protection to parolees, probationers, and prisoners. 3
On the other hand, the Court has taken a very strong pro-governmental
stand on obscenity regulation 4 and has made a concerted effort to limit
* Managing Editor, The Criminal Law Reporter, The Bureau of National Affairs,
Inc., Washington, D.C. The author was assisted in the research of certain parts of this
article by Paul Scott Marshall, a student at the Georgetown University Law Center. This
article is a revised and expanded version of Miles, The Ailing Fourth Amendment: A
Suggested Cure, 63 A.B.A.J. 364 (1977).
1. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (abortion); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) and Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971) ("abusive language" laws); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S.
405 (1974) and Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (flag desecration laws); Papachristou
v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) and Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611
(1971) (vagrancy and loitering laws).
2. See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (unconstitutionality of a jury
instruction that a murder defendant bears burden of showing heat of passion on sudden
provocation); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973) (reciprocal discovery rights under a
state notice-of-alibi rule); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (unconstitutionali-
ty of common-law rule of evidence excluding strong defense evidence from the jury's
consideration and limiting the defendant's right to cross-examine a damaging defense
witness); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel for accused misde-
meanants facing possible incarceration).
3. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (due process rights of prisoners
at prison disciplinary proceedings); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (uncon-
stitutionality of prison mail censorship regulations); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972) (due process rights of a parolee facing revocation of parole).
4. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Jenkins v. Georgia,
418 U.S. 153 (1974); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973); Heller v. New York, 413
U.S. 483 (1973); United States v. Orito. 413 U.S. 139 (1973). United States v. 12 200-ft.
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federal jurisdiction on civil rights issues5 and federal intervention in state
prosecutions and injunctive proceedings.6 Viewed as a whole, the
Court's work presents a rather mixed bag.
No such ambiguity exists, however, with respect to the Court's deci-
sions on constitutional questions involving police practices. Nothing has
left the Court so open to charges that it is restricting individual liberties
as its recent fourth amendment search and seizure opinions. When
today's Court resolves a conflict between the rights of a defendant and
the purported needs of law enforcement officials, law enforcement inter-
ests prevail nearly every time.
Consider the Court's awesome record from 1972 to 1976 of reversing
federal courts of appeals decisions. Excluding one decision on standing7
and a handful of holdings on esoteric questions limited to Border Patrol
Agents, 8 the Court reversed twelve consecutive federal appellate hold-
ings on matters pertaining to the fourth amendment, 9 upholding certain
Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973);
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973). But see McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669 (1976).
5. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409(1976); Rizzo
v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
6. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332
(1975); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216
(1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle
v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971). But see Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974); Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. 452 (1974).
7. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973).
8. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Bowen v. United
States, 422 U.S. 916 (1975); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975); United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). The
effect of these decisions was to articulate some limitations on the stop and search
authority of Border Patrol and Immigration and Naturalization Agents seeking to curb the
flow of illicit drugs and illegal aliens from Mexico. Border searches (or customs searches
as they were once called) have always been governed by standards less strict than those
which the fourth amendment ordinarily demands. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616. 623 (1886). Because border searches have long been considered outside the main-
stream of fourth amendment law, they are not discussed in this article except insofar as
they have a bearing on matters within that mainstream. See, e.g., the majority opinion's
discussion of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule in United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S.
531, 535 (1975). It should be mentioned, however, that the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit has found these decisions a helpful source of guidance
for permit inspection stops of motor vehicles. See United States v. Montgomery, 561 F.2d
875 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
9. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435
(1976); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583
(1974); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S.
164 (1974); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218 (1973); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291
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law enforcement practices found illegal by a court of appeals. Further-
more, during the 1975-76 Term, two state courts joined the ranks of the
reversed. 10
The last day of the Court's 1975-76 Term dramatically reflected the
current majority's fourth amendment philosophy. All four of the deci-
sions announced that day presented search and seizure questions. Al-
though one dealt with a highly specialized issue peculiar to Border Patrol
searches at the Mexican-American border, each of the other three had
broad implications. In South Dakota v. Opperman,"1 the Court reversed
a judgment by the South Dakota Supreme Court, recognizing a broad
right on the part of police departments to inventory the contents of
lawfully impounded automobiles. In United States v. Janis,,2 the Court
overturned a federal court of appeals decision and held that the fourth
amendment's exclusionary rule does not forbid use in a federal civil
proceeding of evidence seized unconstitutionally but in good faith by a
state police officer.
Finally, in Stone v. Powell13 the Court held that the federal courts no
longer have habeas corpus jurisdiction over state prisoners' fourth
amendment claims that have been fully and fairly litigated in state court.
The Stone v. Powell opinion also contained ominous undertones for the
exclusionary rule. Justice Powell, the majority spokesman, chose to
emphasize the price exacted by the exclusionary rule when it precludes
the use of reliable evidence 4 and downplayed the lofty purposes attribut-
ed to the rule in earlier opinions of the Court. This same dissatisfaction
(1973); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973);'Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143
(1972).
10. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was reversed summarily in Texas v. White,
423 U.S. 67 (1975). The South Dakota Supreme Court suffered reversal in South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). On remand, however, it reinstated its own holding by
reaching its original result, this time on state constitutional grounds. Opperman v. State,
- S.D. -, 247 N.W.2d 673 (1976). See also text accompanying note 377 infra.
11. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
12. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
13. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
14. The costs of applying the exclusionary rule even at trial and on direct review
are well known: the focus of the trial, and the attention of the participants
therein, are diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should
be the central concern in a criminal proceeding. Moreover, the physical evidence
sought to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most probative informa-
tion bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant, . . .
Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding process and often frees the
guilty. The disparity in particular cases between the error committed by the police
officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by application of the rule is
contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of justice.
428 U.S. at 489-90 (citations omitted).
1977]
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with the rule permeated the majority opinion in the Janis case as well. 5
Chief Justice Burger and Justice White wrote separate opinions in Stone
expressing their willingness to modify the rule in the future if they could
muster a majority of the Court. 6
Besides being significant in their own right, these cases reflect the
trend of the Court's thinking on search and seizure questions over the
past four or five years. They also indicate some of the other features that
characterize the Court's decisions during that time. For one thing, they
show a marked consistency of approach. In each of the three cases,
rather than accepting the fourth amendment as a fixed constitutional
standard against which police conduct must be measured, the Court has
employed a "balancing" test. The interests protected by the fourth
amendment and its exclusionary rule have been balanced against the
societal interests served by the intrusive law enforcement activity under
scrutiny. 7 This consistency of approach is matched by consistency in
result. In each case, the balance between personal liberty and the gov-
ernmental interest served by the search and seizure is struck in favor of
the governmental interest. These decisions are also consistent with each
other in that each was a Supreme Court reversal of a state or lower
federal court holding that the fourth amendment had been violated.
These latter two consistencies may be explained in part by the role the
Court currently appears to assign the fourth amendment. Opinions in
earlier eras described it as a primary bulwark of a free society, posses-
sing a history dating back to the struggle for independence 18 Nowadays,
however, the Court tends to treat it as one of many counterweights in the
machinery of government. In Opperman, a person's privacy interest in
his automobile yielded to the smooth functioning of the modern police
department in its role as the community caretaker.' 9 In Stone, the need
for finality in judgments and comity in federal-state relations was enough
to strip the federal courts of their role as ultimate protectors of the
freedoms guaranteed by the fourth amendment. 2 The fourth amend-
15. "Jurists and scholars uniformly have recognized that the exclusionary rule imposes
a substantial cost on the societal interest in law enforcement by its proscription of what
concededly is relevant evidence." 428 U.S. at 448-49.
16. 428 U.S. at 496 (Burger, C.J., concurring); 428 U.S. at 536 (White, J., dissenting).
17. "The seminal cases that apply the exclusionary rule to a civil proceeding involve
'intrasovereign' violations, a situation we need not consider here." United States v. Janis,
428 U.S. 433, 456 (1976) (citation omitted). As for the "balancing" test applied in
Opperman and Stone v. Powell, see notes 19-20 & accompanying text infra.
18. See, e.g., Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 303-304 (1921); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 389-392 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-630 (1886).
19. 428 U.S. at 367-76.
20. 428 U.S. at 492-95.
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ment's exclusionary rule, once described as the instrument whereby the
courts protect their integrity as well as the freedom of the people, was
depicted in both Janis and Stone as a judge-made device of doubtful
utility, with no real purpose other than to keep the police in line. 2' While
grudgingly retaining the role for criminal trials, the Court asserted that it
has no place in other proceedings. 22 Read together, Stone and Janis
formulate a kind of containment doctrine for the exclusionary rule: this
far, perhaps, but no further.
23
21. In Stone v. Powell, Justice Powell acknowledged that "our decisions often have
alluded to the 'imperative of judicial integrity,' " and added that these decisions "demon-
strate the limited role of this justification in the determination whether to apply the rule in
a particular context." 428 U.S. at 485. To place this view in contrast, see Justice
Brennan's dissenting opinions in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 502 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 544 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); and
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22. In United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), the Court refused to extend the
exclusionary rule to grand jury questions based on illegally seized evidence. In Janis, the
Court observed:
In short, we conclude that exclusion from federal civil proceedings of evidence
unlawfully seized by a state criminal enforcement officer has not been shown to
have a sufficient likelihood of deterring the conduct of the state police so that it
outweighs the societal costs imposed by the exclusion. This Court, therefore, is
not justified in so extending the exclusionary rule.
428 U.S. at 454 (citation omitted).
23. The Court's string of fourth amendment decisions adverse to defense claims was
broken during the 1976-77 Term. In G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338
(1977), the Court unanimously condemned IRS agents' warrantless entry of a corpora-
tion's office to seize its books and records, refusing to recognize any "broad exception to
the fourth amendment that allows warrantless intrusions into privacy in the furtherance of
enforcement of the tax laws." A corporation had sued the government, seeking return of
the seized items, suppression of all evidence obtained from them, and damages.
The more significant fourth amendment case this Term was United States v. Chadwick,
97 S. Ct. 2476 (1977). In Chadwick, the Court held that federal drug agents who had taken
three marijuana couriers and their luggage safely into custody violated the amendment's
warrant clause by searching the suspects' footlocker without a warrant. The Court
unanimously rejected the government's contention that the full protection of the warrant
clause should not extend beyond homes, offices, and private communications. Chief
Justice Burger's opinion for the majority also indicated that the Court's language about
the limited expectation of privacy in vehicles was limited to vehicles and did not extend to
other personal property.
Both G.M. Leasing and Chadwick are line-drawing decisions; nothing in either of them
indicates a change of mind about the court's other recent fourth amendment decisions.
Chadwick represents a rejection of a bold government effort to take advantage of the
Court's recent relaxation of fourth amendment standards by suggesting that the Court
carve out a new and unprecedented exception to the warrant requirement. Disciples of a
strong fourth amendment can take some comfort from these cases but cannot reasonably
anticipate that they signal a revitalization of the fourth amendment.
This point was underscored recently by the Court's summary reversal of a Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decision concerning police discretion to order traffic offenders out of their
cars. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 46 U.S.L.W. 3369 (Dec. 6, 1977). Applying the balancing
test for reasonableness developed for police intrusions in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
19771
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The beleaguered state of the fourth amendment today results from a
phenomenon which can be traced to the Supreme Court's decision in
Mapp v. Ohio.24 More than sixteen years have passed since a five-four
majority of the Court declared in Mapp that the exclusionary rule of the
fourth amendment applies through the fourteenth amendment to state
court prosecutions. As the Supreme Court explained two Terms later in
Ker v. California ,5 Mapp applied the same constitutional standard to all
law enforcement searches and seizures, whether carried out by federal
officials or by state and local officers. As a result of the Mapp decision,
state criminal justice systems have had to adopt the same search and
seizure standards that applied in the federal courts. Moreover, they have
had to enforce these standards by means of an exclusionary rule which,
at the time of Mapp, nearly half the state supreme courts had declined to
adopt on their own. 26
This article will examine the manner in which the Supreme Court has
adapted the fourth amendment to the demands of state law enforcement
interests, as mandated by the Court in Mapp. The article will begin with
an examination of a line of cases from 1972 through 1976, in which the
Court has seriously weakened fourth amendment protections. It will then
place these recent opinions in an historical context, offering an overview
of the Court's major fourth amendment decisions since Boyd v. United
States27 in 1886. By examining these key cases from the standpoint of
both the Court's perception of the fourth amendment and the kind of law
enforcement activity they involve, a pattern in the Court's treatment of
the fourth amendment emerges. The Court's response to governmental
demands for more latitude in searches and seizures has alternated be-
tween brief periods of stout resistance and longer periods of acquiesc-
ence. The Court has reacted strongly against startling new law enforce-
and subsequent decisions, the per curiam majority found the minor incremental intrusion
involved in ordering a legally stopped motorist to get out of his car clearly was outweighed
by the grave danger that a hostile motorist may pose to the officer.
Justice Stevens, joined in dissent by Justices Brennan and Marshall, accused the
majority of casually adopting a major new category of police seizures requiring even less
justification than the Terry standard. The dissenters also found this announcement of a
general rule to be at odds with the Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence requiring
"individualized inquiry into the particular facts justifying every police intrusion" 46
U.S.L.W. at 3370. In a separate dissent, Justice Marshall emphasized "the extent to
which the Court today departs from the teachings of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968)." 46
U.S.L.W. at 3370.
24. 367 U.S. 643 (1%1).
25. 374 U.S. 23 (1%3).
26. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1960) (Appendix to the Opinion
of the Court).
27. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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ment practices, but as these novel techniques have become more famil-
iar, the Court has become increasingly responsive to government asser-
tions of law enforcement needs and societal interest.
The post-Mapp era, in which the Court has for the first time con-
sidered state law enforcement practices in light of the fourth amend-
ment, reflects yet another cycle in the Court's alternation between vigor-
ous enforcement of the fourth amendment and accommodation of assert-
ed law enforcement interests. Prior to Mapp, the Court dealt almost
exclusively with federal law enforcement activities and never had to
confront the myriad law enforcement problems of state and local offi-
cers. As will be seen, these state and local law enforcement practices are
quite different from federal practices.
The Supreme Court has not been able to accommodate local law
enforcement interests while maintaining a strong fourth amendment bar-
rier to other forms of law enforcement intrusions. A single unitary search
and seizure standard for state, local, and federal officers alike simply
does not work. The exclusionary rule should be modified, therefore,
to free the states from what should be strict federal standards. The
answer lies in the overruling of Mapp v. Ohio. This approach would
permit the states the necessary law enforcement flexibility and, at the
same time, enable the federal courts to enforce strictly high fourth
amendment standards.
II. RECENT LIMITATIONS ON FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION
In Opperman, Janis, and Stone, each of the searches or seizures
declared unconstitutional by the lower court had been carried out by
state law enforcement officers. This feature is significant when seen as
part of an increasing pattern of Supreme Court reversals of federal and
state court decisions. The Supreme Court has explicitly upheld law
enforcement activities found illegal by the federal or state appellate court
in no fewer than.fourteen recent cases, all involving state law enforce-
ment officers. 28
A. Expansion of the "Stop and Frisk" Doctrine
The first such reversal, in Adams v. Williams,29 decided during the
Court's 1971-72 Term, involved an extension of the "stop and frisk"
doctrine first announced in Terry v. Ohio.30 To appreciate the full signifi-
cance of the Adams decision, it is helpful to understand this doctrine and
28. See notes 9-10 supra.
29. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
30. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
1977]
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the strict limits placed upon it by the Terry decision. In Terry, the Court
separated the fourth amendment's warrant clause, with its probable
cause requirement, from the amendment's general prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures, 31 holding that a very limited law
enforcement intrusion on the freedom and privacy of the person, com-
monly known as the "stop and frisk' can be carried out on the basis of
"reasonable suspicion." 32 This doctrine arose from a Cleveland
plainsclothesman's observation of three individuals who apparently were
"casing" a store. Eventually the officer stopped the men and asked them
to identify themselves. When he received a mumbled answer, the officer
turned one of them around and patted him down. The patdown yielded a
revolver which led to a successful prosecution for possession of a con-
cealed deadly weapon. The officer was later able to recount a wealth of
detail about the men's activities that had aroused his suspicion and the
Court upheld this "stop and frisk" as reasonable. 33
Although the discretionary "stop and frisk" doctrine recognized in
Terry arose from the strictly limited circumstances of that case, the
Court's decision in Adams v. Williams indicated its willingness to apply
the doctrine to more questionable situations. In Adams, a police officer
on early morning patrol in a high crime area of Bridgeport, Connecticut
received a tip from an unnamed informant whose reliability was never
established, that a man sitting in a nearby parked car had narcotics in his
possession and a gun at his waist. After radioing for assistance, the
officer approached the car, tapped on the window, and asked the occu-
pant to open the door. When Williams, the occupant, rolled down the
window instead, the officer reached in and grabbed a loaded pistol from
his waistband. 34 A search incident to his arrest for unlawful possession
of the gun yielded narcotics.
The officer's course of conduct was upheld by the Connecticut Su-
preme Court,35 and the United States Supreme Court denied Williams'
petition for certiorari. 36 However, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the
case after the Second Circuit, en banc, granted Williams' habeas corpus
relief, holding that the narcotics were discovered in violation of his
31. For a more detailed description of Terry and the "surgery" the Court performed on
the fourth amendment, see text accompanying notes 330-42 infra.
32. 392 U.S. at 20-27. See also id. at 31-34 (Harlan, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 27-31.
34. These are the facts as they were desctibed at the federal court level. Apparently the
officer's account went through a metamorphosis of sorts. 436 F.2d 30, 36 n.4 (2d Cir.
1970) (Friendly, J., dissenting).
35. 157 Conn. 114, 249 A.2d 245 (1968).
36. 395 U.S. 927 (1969).
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fourth amendment rights.17 A majority of the Supreme Court upheld the
officer's actions as reasonable.38 It also held that once the officer's
discovery of the gun corroborated the informant's tip in part, the officer
had probable cause to believe Williams also had narcotics. 39
In certain respects, these holdings are logical extensions of Terry: the
requisite "articulable suspicion" for a stop can be based on sources
other than the officer's own observation; an occupant of a vehicle who
has aroused the officer's reasonable suspicion is just as properly the
object of a stop and frisk as is a suspicious pedestrian, and an officer
with information about the precise location of a weapon may immediate-
ly seize that weapon without first completing a standard patdown. 4°
Other features of this opinion, however, signaled a substantial loosening
of standards by which a "stop and frisk" will be judged. One is the
quantum of suspicion necessary for a "stop and frisk." In Terry, the
officer was able to relate several clearly suspicious details about the
suspects' behavior. The fact that his suspicions were based upon first-
hand observation made them inherently more reliable. If he had less than
probable cause to make a stop and search, he had very little less.
In Adams v. Williams, however, the reliability of the source of infor-
mation that gave the officer reason to suspect Williams was unproven, 41
and other than the nature of the area and the time of night, nothing about
Williams was inherently suspicious. Unlike the Terry situation, there
was no reason for the officer to fear that the suspect was an immediate
threat to anyone's safety. The initial corroboration of the informer's
tip-the fact that there was a man in a parked car where the informer said
he would be-fell far short of the kind of corroboration that the Court
has said is necessary to show that an informer has obtained and imparted
reliable information about criminal activity .42
37. 441 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1971).
38. 407 U.S. at 146-48.
39. Id. at 148-49.
40. These latter two points were not discussed explicitly but are implicit in the Court's
holding.
41. This point had been stressed by Judge Friendly, whose dissent from the Second
Circuit's original decision denying relief, 436 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1970), was virtually adopted
by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall. Compare 436 F.2d 30, 38-39 (Friendly, J.,
dissenting) with 407 U.S. at 149-50 (Douglas, J., dissenting); 407 U.S. at 151-52 (Brennan,
J., dissenting); and 407 U.S. at 159-60 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
42. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1%9), in which the Court formulated
the standard for assessing an informer's reliability in determining whether his information
furnished probable cause. The point here is not that the officer needed probable cause but
that the gulf between his quantum of suspicion and probable cause was considerably
greater than the gulf facing the officer in Terry. See 407 U.S. 156-59 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
19771
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A second significant feature of Adams v. Williams is the nature of the
alleged offense the officer was investigating. The officer had been told
that Williams had a gun in his possession. Connecticut is a state with
lenient gun laws, however, and the mere possession of a pistol in the
manner alleged was not at all likely to be a criminal offense.4 3 The only
offense of which the officer had reason to suspect Williams was entirely
possessory. Judge Friendly's opinion dissenting from the original Second
Circuit decision, which likely influenced the en banc Second Circuit in
condemning this search, 4 expressed doubt whether a "stop and frisk"
for a purely possessory offense could ever be justified.45
B. Consensual Searches: Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
The Court's first major break with the developing line of fourth
amendment case law, seemingly for the purpose of accommodating state
interests, came the following year in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,46 in
which the Court virtually rewrote the doctrine of voluntariness with
respect to consensual searches. 47 The Bustamonte decision arose out of
a search by local police officers in Sunnyvale, California. After stopping
an automobile with six male occupants, the officers obtained the consent
of one of the occupants to search the car. The state never demonstrated
that the consenting individual knew he had the right to withhold consent
and require the officers to have probable cause to justify a decision to
search without a warrant. A California court of appeals" found the
consent voluntary under the "totality of the circumstances" test set
forth several years before by the state supreme court in People v.
Michael.49 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
ordered habeas corpus relief for Bustamonte, who had been convicted
on the basis of evidence found in the search.5" The Ninth Circuit did so
on the ground that California's "totality of the circumstances" test was
insufficient to define the validity of a given search.5
43. 436 F.2d at 38 (Friendly, J., dissenting). See also 407 U.S. at 149 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); 407 U.S. at 158-59 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
44. The en banc court issued a short per curiam opinion, which stated that "Sergeant
Connolly had neither probable cause to arrest Williams nor any other sufficient cause for
reaching into Williams' waistband .... "441 F.2d at 394.
45. See 436 F.2d at 38.
46. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
47. See Wefing & Miles, Consent Searches and the Fourth Amendment: Voluntariness
and Third Party Problems, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 211, 240-252 (1974) (hereinafter
referred to as Wefing & Miles).
48. People v. Bustamonte, 270 Cal. App. 2d 648, 652, 76 Cal. Rptr. 17, 20 (Ct. App.
1969).
49. 45 Cal. 2d 751, 290 P.2d 852 (1955).
50. 448 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1971).
51. Id. at 700-01.
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An impressive array of federal and state authority supported the Ninth
Circuit's holding. In recent years, there had existed a consensus among
federal and state courts that consent to search is a waiver of fundamental
rights, and that such waiver must be knowing and intelligent.5 2 Califor-
nia's position that a valid consent could be based on less than a showing
of a knowing and intelligent waiver was the minority view, even among
the states. Furthermore, the waiver standard had been derived by state
and lower federal courts from the Supreme Court's own opinions dealing
with consent searches.5 3
Nevertheless, the Court abandoned the waiver standard in deciding
Bustamonte. It relied on interrogation cases predating Miranda v. Arizo-
na 54 to devise a "totality of the circumstances" test for "noncustodial"
consents that was, if anything, more lenient than the California stan-
dard. 55 Justice Stewart's opinion for the majority was a tortuous effort to
meet "the legitimate need for such searches"; 56 he emphasized that an
officer with suspicion but no probable cause may have no other "means
of obtaining important and reliable evidence." 57
C. The Non-Consensual Warrantless Search Cases
The Supreme Court's growing tendency to interpret restrictively
fourth amendment protections continued in Cupp v. Murphy.5 8 Again
overruling the Ninth Circuit, the Court upheld a warrantless forcible
extraction of material from under the fingernails of a murder suspect.
The Oregon police officers who scraped his nails had probable cause to
arrest him at the time, but chose to release him temporarily once they
had obtained the evidence. Justice Stewart, again writing for the majori-
ty, held that the detention of the suspect against his will was a seizure
and the scraping was clearly a search.5 9 However, the presence of
probable cause to arrest the suspect,60 the highly destructible nature of
the evidence sought, and the minimal intrusion which the search and
seizure entailed, all made the procedure reasonable. 61
52. See Wefing & Miles, supra note 47, at 227-40.
53. See id. at 217-27.
54. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
55. See Wefing & Miles, supra note 47, at 250.
56. 412 U.S. at 227.
57. Id.
58. 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
59. Id. at 294-95.
60. Justice Douglas, who dissented in part, contended that the Ninth Circuit never
reached the probable cause question. Id. at 301. Justice Brennan agreed with him that the
case should have been remanded to the court of appeals for a finding on the probable
cause issue. Id. at 301 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61. The Court relied on the principles announced in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
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The peculiar needs of local law enforcement officers underlay a sec-
ond decision during the 1972-73 Term upholding a warrantless search. In
Cady v. Dombrowski,62 the Court upheld a warrantless search of a
wrecked car belonging to an in-custody drunk driving defendant. The
"search" was in the nature of an automobile inventory. The seriously
injured defendant was an off-duty Chicago police officer, and the small-
town Wisconsin officers who handled the car searched it, pursuant to
departmental policy, 63 to secure the service revolver which they thought
the defendant was required by law to have with him at all times. The
officer who performed the search found evidence in the trunk linking the
defendant to the murder of which he was eventually convicted. The
Seventh Circuit held this search unconstitutional.4
Although Cady v. Dombrowski is an interesting case for a number of
reasons, 65 its significance for this study lies in its recognition that, at
least when automobiles are concerned, there are fundamental differ-
ences between the role of federal law enforcement agents and the func-
tion of local police officers. As stated in Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion:
[T]he application of Fourth Amendment standards, originally
intended to restrict only the Federal Government, to the States
presents some difficulty when searches of automobiles are in-
volved. The contact with vehicles by federal law enforcement
officers usually, if not always, involves the detection or investi-
gation of crimes unrelated to the operation of a vehicle. 66
Rehnquist went on to state that under our federal system of government,
state and local police officers have much greater contact with vehicles
"for reasons related to the operation of vehicles themselves,' 67 and that
due to the extensive regulation of vehicles and traffic, the "police-citizen
(1969), also written by Justice Stewart. See 412 U.S. 295-96. However, the Court did not
hold "that a full Chimel search would have been justified in this case without a formal
arrest and without a warrant. But the respondent was not subjected to such a search." Id.
at 296.
62. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
63. The officer who made the search testified that the effort to find the revolver "was
standard procedure in our department." Id. at 437.
64. 471 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1972).
65. On its most superficial level, the case is interesting as one of an increasing number
of Supreme Court reversals of lower federal court decisions holding state law enforcement
officers to strict fourth amendment standards. More significantly, it is one of a series of
cases in which the Court moved closer to outright approval of routine inventory investiga-
tions. See, e.g., Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) and Harris v. United States, 390
U.S. 234 (1968), which were ultimately given "carte blanche" approval in South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
66. 413 U.S. at 440.
67. Id. at 441.
[Vol. 27:9
Decline of the Fourth Amendment
contact involving automobiles will be substantially greater than police-
citizen contact in a home or office." 68 Accordingly, these local police
officers will be called upon to perform a variety of "community caretak-
ing functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or ac-
quisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute." 69
D. The Custodial Search Cases
The following Term the Court's rollback of fourth amendment protec-
tions concentrated on the area of searches incident to arrest, and again
its most notable decisions dealt with law enforcement problems peculiar
to local rather than federal officers. In two traffic arrest cases, United
States v. Robinson70 and Gustafson v. Florida ,71 the Court held that,
incident to a lawful arrest, a law enforcement officer's authority to make
a full search of the person requires no justification beyond the fact of the
custodial arrest itself. The Court squarely rejected the view that a full
search of an arrested person is justified only for reasons of safety and
securing evidence of the offense. It thus found the "limited search"
rationale of Terry v. Ohio72 inapplicable to custodial arrests for offenses,
such as traffic violations, that involve no evidence other than the fact of
the illegal act.
In Robinson, the majority reversed a District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals decision and held admissible heroin discovered by an
officer during his search of a traffic offender being taken into custody
for a violation carrying a mandatory minimum jail term, a mandatory
minimum fine, or both. The search, carried out pursuant to standard
District of Columbia "field arrest" procedures, 73 was motivated by
neither fear on the officer's part nor a belief that there was further
evidence of crime on the offender's person. The search went beyond the
person to an examination of the contents of a crumpled cigarette package
found in a pocket of the offender's coat.
In Gustafson, the Court affirmed the Florida Supreme Court and
extended its Robinson holding to an arrest for a minor traffic offense
that was later cleared up. As in Robinson, the search went beyond the
person to the interior of a cigarette box in which the officer found
marijuana. From the record, it is arguable that at the time the officer
took the offender, a local college student, into custody, he did not intend
68. Id.
69. Ld.
70. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
71. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
72. See notes 30-33 & accompanying text supra.
73. See 414 U.S. at 221 n.2 for testimony regarding these "field arrest" procedures.
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to put the youth through usual arrest procedures at all. The youth did not
have his license in his possession, but explained-truthfully as it turned
out-that the license was back at his room. According to the officer's
testimony, he took the youth into custody "in order to transport him to
the stationhouse for further inquiry."
74
The implicit premise on which the Court's decisions in these two cases
rested was spelled out explicitly by Justice Powell in his concurrence:
"[T]he custodial arrest is the significant intrusion of state power into the
privacy of one's person. If the arrest is lawful, the privacy interest
guarded by the Fourth Amendment is subordinated to the legitimate and
overriding governmental concern." 75 This premise, as Justice Marshall
-demonstrated in his dissent, was at odds with numerous state and lower
federal court decisions specifically disapproving of searches of traffic
offenders that go beyond the need to secure the safety of the arresting
officer. 76 Moreover, as the Marshall dissent also noted, the Supreme
Court itself had rejected it less than five years earlier, in Chimel v.
California.7
The Robinson and Gustafson holdings also had implications beyond
the search incident to arrest doctrine. They seemed to imply that in
certain situations police have unqualified authority to conduct a full
warrantless search. Furthermore, the legality of such searches no longer
need be adjudicated on a case-by-case basis. This grant of blanket police
power insulated from judicial review may appear inconsistent with the
Court's "case-by-case" language in Cady v. Dombrowski78 and Schneck-
loth v. Bustamonte.79 These two seemingly contradictory lines of
thought, however, had something in common. As applied in the cases in
which they were developed, each expanded the discretionary power of
the police by allowing them to engage in intrusive activities without
obtaining prior judicial approval.
In Edwards v. United States,80 the Court further broadened the right
of police to make custodial searches by holding that an officer's authori-
ty to make a warrantless search of a person incident to an arrest is not
limited to a period of time contemporaneous with the actual arrest, as it
had indicated in several previous opinions. 81 Thus the Court upheld local
74. Id. at 262.
75. 414 U.S. at 237 (Powell, J., concurring). This concurrence accompanied both the
Robinson and Gustafson cases.
76. 414 U.S. at 244-247 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 256-57, citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
78. See 413 U.S. 433, 448 (1973).
79. See 412 U.S. 218, 233 (1973).
80. 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
81. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 767 (1969); Stoner v. California,
376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1964).
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officers' seizure of clothing from a jailed burglary suspect whose arrest
had taken place about eight hours earlier. The arrest took place at eleven
P.M., the officers had reasonable cause to believe that the clothing of the
defendant contained paint particles, and the police were not able to buy
replacement clothing for the suspect until the next morning. Given these
circumstances, the Court felt it reasonable for the officers to delay their
search until they were able to obtain other clothing for the defendant to
wear. The Court was also impressed with the fact that the police had
custody of the clothing as well as the suspect, without removing the
clothing from the suspect or the cell. 8
2
Edwards cannot be characterized as an outright break with previous
precedent, as can Bustamonte, nor can it be read as a sweeping grant of
warrantless police authority as can Robinson and Gustafson. As Justice
Stewart pointed out in his dissent, however, it dealt yet another blow to
the idea that the police must take advantage of every opportunity to get a
warrant. 83 Rather, Justice White's opinion for the majority reflected the
view, perhaps developed most fully several years previous in Chambers
v. Maroney,84 that given initial police authority to make a warrantless
search at a time when they obtained probable cause under exigent cir-
cumstances, there is no reason later to require that a warrant be ob-
tained, even though the exigent circumstances have vanished and it is
now possible for the police to obtain judicial approval.
E. The Automobile Search Cases
This same relaxed view of delayed warrantless searches of items taken
into police custody underlay the Court's plurality opinion in Cardwell v.
Lewis8 5 which upheld the warrantless seizure of an in-custody Ohio
murder suspect's car from a public parking lot and the warrantless
examination of the car the next day for tire and exterior paint matchups.
Because the "search" at issue was confined to the car's exterior and
because the Court split four to four on the merits, Cardwell did not have
an immediate major impact on the lower courts. Nevertheless, Justice
Blackmun's plurality opinion made a major doctrinal addition to the idea
that vehicles enjoy less protection under the fourth amendment than
dwellings or other buildings. The Court's previous decisions recognizing
exceptions to the warrant requirements with respect to car searches
82. 415 U.S. at 804-805.
83. See 415 U.S. at 809 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
84. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
85. 417 U.S. 583 (1974). Justice Powell concurred with the majority on the basis of his
limited view of the proper scope of federal habeas corpus relief. Id. at 596 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
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focused on the mobility of the vehicle. 86 In Cardwell, however, Black-
mun, borrowing from a recently announced border search case involving
far different considerations, 87 emphasized that a search of an automobile
is generally far less intrusive than a search of a person or building:
One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle
because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as
one's residence or as the repository of personal effects. A car
has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public
thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in
plain view. 88
Since this language was later quoted verbatim by Chief Justice Burger
in his opinion for the Opperman majority89 and has recently become a
staple of lower court opinions upholding warrantless vehicle searches, 90
Cardwell has been given far greater significance than its limited facts and
plurality status would seem to justify. By providing another major con-
sideration other than the actual mobility of the vehicle in evaluating a
warrantless search, this opinion has further reduced the protection of
motorists against warrantless searches of their vehicles.
Thus, despite the Court's protestations to the contrary, it has moved
closer to recognizing an "automobile exception" to the warrant require-
ment, rather than the mobility exception heretofore applied to vehicles,
which required an additional showing that the vehicle was mobile at the
time of the search or seizure. In so doing, it has indicated that some
things protected by the fourth amendment against unreasonable searches
and seizures are less protected than others. Cardwell and subsequent
decisions relying upon it offer classic examples of the way in which the
continued refinement of fourth amendment law has served to weaken the
amendment's protections.
86. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 460-461 n.18 (1971); Cham-
bers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 50-51 (1970); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S.
216, 221-22 (1968); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-159 (1925).
87. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
88. 417 U.S. at 590.
89. 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 538 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977); United States v. Robinson, 533 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Haefeli v. Chernoff, 526 F.2d 1314 (1st Cir. 1975). But see United States v. Farnkoff, 535
F.2d 661 (1st Cir. 1976). In all the decisions the courts held that the exigency requirement
still applies to automobile searches as well as other searches. Even Judge Leventhal's
opinion for the court in United States v. Robinson, stopped short of embracing Cardwell's
"lesser expectation of privacy" language to the extent that the First Circuit had in Haefeli
v. Chernoff or the Fifth Circuit had .in United States v. Mitchell. Also, even seeming
acceptance of the Cardwell "lesser expectation of privacy" rationale did not mean
abandonment of the mobility requirement. See United States v. Kelly, 547 F.2d 82 (8th
Cir. 1977).
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The authority of law enforcement officials to search automobiles
without a warrant received yet another boost in Texas v. White,91 a per
curiam opinion announced the following Term. Summarily reversing the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the Court upheld as reasonable a
warrantless stationhouse search of a bad check suspect's car seized by
Amarillo police less than an hour before at a drive-in bank window. The
majority's summary disposal of this case, as well as the fact that it was a
state court whose decision was found to have interpreted the fourth
amendment too expansively, can be taken as an indication of the sorry
state to which the warrant requirement has now fallen with respect to
vehicle searches. This point was underscored by dissenting Justice Mar-
shall who observed that, unlike Chambers v. Maroney, upon which the
majority purported to rely, this case did not present a vehicle seizure
under circumstances in which an immediate search would have been
impractical or unsafe.92
F. Expectation of Privacy Cases
The 1975-76 Term marked more than the erosion of fourth amendment
protections vis-A-vis vehicles; the Court also handed down a series of
decisions which significantly limited the "expectation of privacy" doc-
trine. In the first of these cases, United States v. Watson,93 the Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit and approved a distinction between arrests
and searches. An arrest made in a public place by a postal inspector with
probable cause to believe that the suspect had committed a felony was
not undone by the inspector's failure to get a warrant despite ample time
to do so. 91 The Court found ample support for its holding; a number of
cases had recognized warrantless arrest authority with respect to defend-
ants apprehended in public places, and federal and state laws appeared to
confer this authority on specified officers. 95
The majority explicitly declined to transform the judicial preference
for a warrant
into a constitutional rule when the judgment of the Nation and
Congress has for so long been to authorize warrantless public
91. 423 U.S. 67 (1975).
92. See Id. at 72 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
93. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
94. Several days before the arrest, an informer of proven reliability had told the
inspector about Watson's offer to share the use of a stolen credit card, and the informer
had delivered the stolen card to the inspector. The arrest was made pursuant to a
prearranged strategy devised by the informer and the inspector. The informer arranged
with Watson to meet at a designated restaurant, and the inspector observed the meeting.
Upon a signal from the informer that Watson had additional stolen cards, the inspector
moved in and made the arrest. Id. at 412-413.
95. Id. at 414-424.
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arrests on probable cause rather than to encumber criminal
prosecutions with endless litigation with respect to the existence
of exigent circumstances, whether it was practicable to get a
warrant, whether the suspect was about to flee, and the like. 96
Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion contended that the majority's his-
torical analysis of the common-law rule was simply wrong.97 He admitted
that early decisions had allowed warrantless searches of felony suspects,
but went on to note that felonies comprised a much smaller percentage of
the number of total crimes. A large number of offenses are today clas-
sified as felonies which were earlier categorized as misdemeanors. Ac-
cordingly, the Court has actually reduced, rather than maintained, com-
mon law protections in dealing with persons suspected of committing a
modern felony. 98 The Watson majority, he contended, was adopting the
partially overruled and fairly discredited "reasonableness of the search"
criterion of Rabinowitz v. United States. 99
United States v. Santana,'°° decided a few months after Watson,
extended the "public places" concept to the door of a suspect's home. ' 0'
In doing so, the Court also made clear that the "reasonable expectation
of privacy" doctrine, first set forth in Katz v. United States, 2 can
narrow a suspect's fourth amendment protections as well as expand
them. Santana also broadened the "hot pursuit" exception to the war-
rant requirement, which had been applied in Warden v. Hayden 03 to an
obviously dangerous fleeing felon. 104 Nothing in the facts of Santana
indicated that the fleeing suspect was at all dangerous. Rather, the
justification was that the narcotics the officers had probable cause to
believe were in the suspect's possession would be destroyed if they did
not enter her house and apprehend her immediately. 0 5
96. Id. at 423-424.
97. Id. at 434, 436-453 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 438-441.
99. Id. at 444. See the discussion of United States v. Rabinowitz, notes 220-22 &
accompanying text infra.
100. 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
101. The police first sought to arrest Santana as she stood in the doorway of her home,
holding a brown bag, just minutes after they had arrested one of her street sellers. The
officers drove to within 15 feet of her house, shouting "police" and identifying them-
selves. Santana retreated into the vestibule, where she was apprehended. Heroin-filled
envelopes fell out of the bag in the ensuing struggle.
102. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). For a discussion of Katz, see notes 290-93 & accompanying
text infra. While the Katz opinion had the effect of extending fourth amendment protec-
tions by tying them to the right of the people to be free from governmental intrusions, the
Court recognized that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of fourth amendment protection." Id. at 351.
103. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
104. The defendant in Hayden had just committed an armed robbery.
105. 427 U.S. at 43.
[Vol. 27:9
Decline of the Fourth Amendment
United States v. Miller,1°6 in which the Court reversed a decision by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, can be read as
yet another decision in which the Court applied the "reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy" doctrine to give a suspect less protection against
searches and seizure than he or she might have enjoyed under the
property law concepts predating Katz. In Miller, the Court held that
neither expectation of privacy nor the venerable fourth amendment
protection against compelled production of personal papers, spelled out
in Boyd v. United States,1°7 could shelter a bank customer from a
government subpoena directing the bank to turn over the records of its
transactions with him. 08 The Court held that the fourth amendment
simply does not apply to such a subpoena. Justice Powell's majority
opinion stated that these records are not "private papers" of the kind
protected by Boyd; rather, they are the bank's records of its negotiations
with the aggrieved individual. By choosing to deal with the bank, the
individual has lost his expectation of fourth amendment protection
against government investigation, and this applies as well to the docu-
ments involved.' °9
G. The Exclusionary Rule Cases
There are several recent decisions with extremely important implica-
tions for the exclusionary rule. Janis and Stone v. Powell are, of course,
among these. But two others also bear mentioning, for they reflect the
same rather jaundiced view of the exclusionary rule. In United States v.
Calandra,10 the Court, in reversing the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, held that the policies behind the rule do not require
its extension to grand jury inquiries based on illegally seized evidence.
United States v. Peltier"i reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the
rule's policies did not justify its retroactive application to good-faith
Border Patrol searches.
106. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
107. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
108. Miller was a moonshine suspect whose operations had begun to unravel. The
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Bureau presented Miller's banks with grand jury sub-
poenas issued in blank by a United States district court clerk and completed by the United
States Attorney's office. The subpoenas ordered the presidents of these banks to appear
on a designated day and to produce all records of Miller's accounts for several months.
The banks did not notify Miller of the subpoenas or of their compliance with them.
109. 425 U.S. at 442-43. Applying a line of "misplaced confidence" cases in which
defendants make incriminating statements or revelations to informers, the Court found
the analysis in these cases unchanged by the mandatory recordkeeping requirements of
the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d) (1970). See United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Osborn v. United States,
385 U.S. 323 (1966); and Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
110. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
111. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
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Justice Powell, spokesman for the Calandra majority, said nothing of
the exclusionary rule's purpose as a protector of judicial integrity;
rather, he saw its prime purpose as a deterrence to "future unlawful
police conduct . . . . [T]he rule is a judicially created remedy designed
to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party ag-
grieved.""12 In a footnote, Powell expressed some doubt about the rule's
value even for this purpose. Referring to the frequently cited article by
Dallin Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, "11 he
noted "some disagreement as to the practical efficacy of the exclusio-
nary rule. . . . We have no occasion in the present case to consider the
extent of the rule's efficacy in criminal trials."'' 4
Alarmed by this language, Justice Brennan vigorously dissented:
In Mapp, the Court thought it had 'close[d] the only courtroom
door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawless-
ness' in violation of Fourth Amendment rights. The door is
again ajar. As a consequence, I am left with the uneasy feeling
that today's decision may signal that a majority of my collea-
gues have positioned themselves to reopen the door still further
and abandon altogether the exclusionary rule in search-and-
seizure cases."'
Of course, Justice Brennan's fears have not yet been fully realized. In
Stone v. Powell, the Court re-examined the exclusionary rule" 6 but
stopped short of abolishing or modifying it. Justice Powell, writing the
majority opinion in Stone, expressed the same view of the exclusionary
rule as he did in Calandra, carefully reiterating the reasons for according
the judicial integrity imperative little weight in measuring the value of the
rule."'7 Although the Court concluded that the exclusionary rule should
be retained for state criminal prosecutions, it did not firmly shut the door
that Justice Brennan feared had been left ajar in Calandra. Powell
stressed that the rule "was a judicially created means of effectuating the
rights secured by the Fourth Amendment."" 8 He observed that prior to
112. 414 U.S. at 348.
113. 37 U. Cm. L. REV. 665 (1970).
114. 414 U.S. at 348 n.5.
115. Id. at 365 (citation omitted). It is both noteworthy and ironic that the Oaks article
cited by Justice Powell and repeatedly referred to by Chief Justice Burger in calling for
reexamination of the rule, see, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388,
416 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting), is quoted at length by Justice Brennan in defense of
the rule. See 414 U.S. at 348 n.5.
116. 428 U.S. at 484-94.
117. Id. at 482-89.
118. Id. at 482.
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Weeks v. United States,' 19 in which the rule was first explicitly adopted,
"there existed no barrier to the introduction in criminal trials of evidence
obtained in violation of the Amendment."' 20 This language left little
doubt that what the Court had given in Weeks it could take away at some
future date. Even more ominous were the opinions of Chief Justice
Burger and Justice White, in which they stated their willingness to
modify the reach of the exclusionary rule, even if it is retained for a small
and limited category of cases. 2'
III. AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. At The Beginning: Boyd v. United States
At the risk of some oversimplification it might be said that the state of
the fourth amendment today follows naturally from interrelated devel-
opments dating back to the last century. These developments have
placed heavy pressures on the Court to alter its "original perception" of
the fourth amendment as both a natural consequence of the American
struggle for independence and an indispensable check on government
power in a free society. The term "original perception" is used advised-
ly, for the Court's first significant declaration of fourth amendment
principles came in 1886, in Boyd v. United States.122
Justice Bradley's opinion for the Boyd majority merits close study, for
it has guided generations of judges who have struggled with search and
seizure problems. In the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, it gave "legal
effect to the broad historic policy underlying the fourth amendment.' 123
Boyd's premises regarding the inadmissibility of illegally obtained evi-
dence and the interrelationship of the fourth and fifth amendments led to
the formulation of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. The con-
troversy with which Boyd dealt was a harbinger-a sign that times were
changing, and that the government was beginning to assume a more
active and aggressive role in people's lives. 124 The majority opinion may
be read as a reaction to a particular manifestation of the changing
119. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
120. 428 U.S. at 482.
121. Id. at 496, 536-42.
122. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
123. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 160 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
124. The proposition that "the government was on its way to assuming a more active
and aggressive role in the lives of the people" means merely that Congress was finally
awakening to the need for federal regulation of big business. Although the subpoena
powers contained in the customs revenue legislation were found unconstitutionally broad
in Boyd, subsequent regulatory legislation compelling the production of documents,
books and papers was upheld by the Court. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (a
corporation has no fifth amendment right to refuse to submit its books and papers incident
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relationship between the government and its citizens. In resolving a
newly-felt tension between perceived government needs and citizens'
rights, the Court resisted any temptation to compromise the individual's
well-established freedoms. It discussed but refused to approve several
lower court decisions offering a "balancing" approach to these constitu-
tional issues.' 25
At issue in Boyd was the constitutionality of a section in a federal
customs revenue statute 126 authorizing a federal judge to compel prod-
uction, in a civil forfeiture proceeding, of private business records be-
lieved by government attorneys to contain evidence tending to prove
''any allegation" that "the defendant or claimant" had defrauded the
government of customs revenues.127 According to Bradley it was the first
legislation authorizing the search and seizure of a man's private papers
or their compulsory production for use as evidence against him in a
criminal case, or in a proceeding to enforce the forfeiture of his proper-
ty. 128 Originating in the heat of the Civil War, it "was adopted at a period
of great national excitement, when the powers of the government were
subjected to a severe strain to protect the national existence."' 12 9
The Court declared the measure unconstitutional: "[C]ompulsory
production of a man's private papers to establish a criminal charge
against him, or to forfeit his property" is not only within the scope of the
fourth amendment "in all cases in which a search or seizure would
to a subpoena under the Sherman Act; and an official of the corporation which is charged
with criminal violation of the statute cannot plead the criminality of the corporation as a
refusal to produce its books); ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894) (section 12 of Interstate
Commerce Act, which provides that the Interstate Commerce Commission may compel
the production of all books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements, and documents relating
to any matter under investigation by the Commission, is constitutional).
The law that was considered in Boyd, an "Act to amend the custom revenue laws, and
to repeal moieties," 18 Stat. 186 (1874) originated as civil war legislation, but was amended
after the war had ended. For the Boyd Court's account of the legislative history of the
Act, see 166 U.S. at 620-22.
125. These lower court decisions, upholding the same basic legislation struck down in
Boyd, are discussed in the Boyd opinion. See 116 U.S. at 635-38. Of particular interest is
Stockwell v. United States, 23 F. Cas. 116 (C.C.D. Me. 1870) (No. 13,466), cited at 116
U.S. 635. In Stockwell, the Court upheld a warrant authorizing the search for books,
invoices, and other papers pertaining to an illegal importation. The Court reasoned that
since collection statutes authorizing the seizure of goods liable to duty were enacted
contemporaneously with the enactment of the fourth and fifth amendments, no objection
to a warrant for seizure of papers, invoices, and books pertaining to such goods could be
made.
126. 18 Stat. 186 (1874). See also note 124 supra.
127. 116 U.S. at 620-21.
128. Id. at 622-23. The Court stated elsewhere that forfeiture proceedings of this
nature, "though they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal." Id. at 634.
129. Id. at 621.
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be,"-1 30 but is an unreasonable search and seizure. 131 Evidence obtained
from government attorneys' inspection of the books and papers pro-
duced in this case pursuant to the judge's production order should never
have been used in the forfeiture proceeding.
Beyond a doubt, Bradley said, "when the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments were penned and adopted, the language of Lord Camden"' 132 in
Entick v. Carrington 133 "was relied on as expressing the true doctrine on
the subject of searches and seizures, and as furnishing the true criteria of
the reasonable and 'unreasonable' character of such seizures.' 34 This
"true doctrine" of limits on government searches and seizures set forth
in Entick v. Carrington was the same doctrine which spurred the colon-
ists in February, 1761 to attack the British government's use of the
infamous writs of assistance. 135 The 1761 debate, Bradley suggested,
"was perhaps the most prominent event which inaugurated the resist-
130. Id. at 622.
131. Id. at 635.
132. Id. at 630.
133. 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765). Entick was a trespass action brought by a plaintiff
whose home had been invaded and whose personal papers and effects had been seized and
examined by officers acting pursuant to a general warrant. The case is famous for the
landmark opinion of Lord Camden declaring that general warrants for the seizure of
papers and personal property were a form of governmental outlawry. The decision ended
the practice of the British secretaries of state issuing these warrants for the seizure of
books and papers that might be used to convict their owners of libel.
Lord Camden's opinion exhibits a strong Lockean influence, for it is bottomed on the
sanctity of property in an ordered society. A man's papers are his dearest personal
property, Lord Camden asserted, and their seizure is thus governed by the law of property
pertaining to trespass. Since an unauthorized trespass upon another's property renders
one liable, even without a showing of damages, Lord Camden reasoned that the seizure of
a man's papers would likewise be illegal, unless authorized by the owner or by the courts.
Because even the procedural safeguards for governmental search and seizure of alleged-
ly stolen goods-a far lesser intrusion than the search for and seizure of a man's personal
papers-were not followed by the government in Entick, the seizure of Entick's personal
papers was illegal.
The influence of Lord Camden's opinion upon the language and purpose of the fourth
amendment is obvious. Entick v. Carrington was a timely case for the development of
American constitutional law. Announced in 1765, just four years after James Otis in
Boston condemned writs of assistance, it came during a time of bitter controversy in
England and America-especially in Massachusetts-over governmental search and sei-
zure practices. Many of the men who drafted the federal constitution and the Mas-
sachusetts constitution, from which the fourth amendment was derived, were familiar
with Entick v. Carrington and the practices it condemned. The seeds of the Boyd doctrine
of the interrelationship between the fourth amendment and the privilege against self-
incrimination, from which the "mere evidence" rule announced in Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), was derived, are also to be found in Entick. Additionally, the
exclusionary rule's roots may be found in the right of an aggrieved search victim to the
return of items in which his possessory interest is superior to the government's.
134. 116 U.S. at 630 (emphasis supplied).
135. Id. at 625.
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ance of the colonies to the oppressions of the mother country."',3 6
Indeed, John Adams had said that "then and there was the first scene of
the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then
and there the child Independence was born.' 3 7
The rights and values protected by the fourth and fifth amendments
were seen by the Court as essential to a free society. They could not
yield, consistent with their history and purpose, to measures deemed
essential to the efficient collection of revenue.138 These amendments
simply forbade the seizure of a man's own books and papers for use as
evidence against him in a suit designed to punish him as a criminal or
deprive him of his property.
A major thesis in the Boyd opinion is that the fourth and fifth amend-
ments should work together to protect private papers against seizure or
compelled production:
For the 'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the
Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of
compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in
criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and com-
pelling a man 'in a criminal case to be a witness against himself,'
which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on
the question as to what is an 'unreasonable search and seizure'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. And we have
been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private
books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substan-
tially different from compelling him to be a witness against
himself. 139
This point was basic to the Court's distinction between searches for and
seizures of "stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties and
concealed to avoid the payment thereof" and searches for and seizures
of "a man's private books and papers for the purpose of obtaining
information therein contained, or of using them as evidence against him
... . In the one case, the government is entitled to the possession of the
property; in the other it is not."'" The distinction between these two
kinds of evidence led to the formulation of the "mere evidence rule"
thirty five years later. 14 1 The seeds of the exclusionary rule itself are also
contained in Boyd. Besides explicitly declaring that the law in question
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 636.
139. Id. at 633.
140. Id. at 623.
141. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). See also text accompanying
notes 164-170 infra.
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was unconstitutional, the Court said that both the United States Attor-
ney's inspection of the telltale invoice and the invoice's admission into
evidence "were erroneous and unconstitutional proceedings. "142
Of course, the mere evidence rule and the Boyd Court's perception of
the interrelationship between the fourth and fifth amendments have not
survived. The mere evidence rule fell in 1967,143 at a time when the Court
was "freeing" the fourth amendment from property law concepts said to
unduly hinder its protection of people and their privacy' 44 and led to
anomalous results. 145 Indeed, taken as a whole, Boyd is limited by its
emphasis on private property considerations. It is clear that the present
Court, which has used the separation of property concepts from the
fourth amendment to reduce the strength of the amendment's protec-
tion,"4 considers Boyd of limited value. 47
If one refuses to give the fourth amendment the broad, liberal interpre-
tation that Justice Bradley thought necessary to serve its historical pur-
pose, then Boyd indeed has limited value. But it is worth recalling why
Justice Bradley thought such an interpretation was mandated. In re-
sponse to the assertion that the procedure authorized by the law in
question lacked many of the aggravating features of an actual search and
seizure, Bradley wrote:
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices
get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches
and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure . . . .It is
the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of
the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.
48
This warning emphasizes that Boyd was a reaction to an old evil in a
new form. The Court perceived in the customs statute a governmental
effort to reduce the privacy of its citizens. While different in form from
142. 116 U.S. at638.
143. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
144. Id. at 303-06.
145. Id. at 308-10. In laying to rest the mere evidence rule in Warden, Justice Brennan
wrote for the Court that the rule "has spawned exceptions so numerous and confusion so
great, in fact, that it is questionable whether it affords meaningful protection." Id. at 309.
146. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976). In Santana, the Court held that
a resident of a dwelling house had no expectation of privacy when police observed her
actions as she stood in the doorway of her house. The doorway was equivalent to a public
place for fourth amendment purposes, concluded the Court, since she had knowingly
exposed her actions to people in public areas. Id. at 42.
147. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). In Fisher, the Court held that a
taxpayer's privilege against self-incrimination was not violated by enforcement of an IRS
summons addressed to the taxpayer's attorney for production of an accountant's work
papers that had been transferred through the taxpayer to the attorney. Id. at 400.
148. 116 U.S. at 635.
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general warrants and concededly less obnoxious, the statute's compul-
sory production provision was, like the general warrants and writs of
assistance, another manifestation of a government's propensity for re-
ducing its citizens to subjects. To the Boyd Court, the fourth amendment
was intended as a bulwark against this threat. It was an adaptable
instrument, and was capable of preventing intrusive practices never
contemplated by its drafters.
B. The First Accommodation
The first cases citing Boyd retreated somewhat from its broad pro-
nouncements. In Adams v. New York, "I the Court found no constitu-
tional violation in a seizure of private papers belonging to a state gam-
bling defendant. The police officers seized the papers while executing a
warrant to search the defendant's office for policy slips. 150 The papers
were introduced at trial to identify the handwriting on the policy slips as
the defendant's and to show that they were in the same custody as the
slips.1 51 Since the Court held that the seizure was constitutional, it was
unnecessary to decide whether the fourth and fifth amendments applied
to the states through the fourteenth. 152 However, Justice Day, the major-
ity spokesman, stated in dictum that there was no constitutional barrier
to introducing unlawfully seized evidence in a criminal trial. 5 3 The Court
was clearly influenced by the position that state courts had taken on this
issue. 54 Justice Day referred to Boyd's discussion of the origins of the
fourth and fifth amendments but went on to say that the amendments
149. 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
150. Id. at 588.
151. Id. at 588, 594.
152. The legitimacy of the search and seizure had not been challenged at trial. Accord-
ingly, the Court limited its inquiry to the competency of the evidence. Id. at 594. In dicta,
however, the Court clearly indicated that even if the search and seizure had been illegally
conducted, the evidence taken, if competent, would have been admissible. Id. at 595-96.
Favorably discussed as "perhaps the leading" case supporting that proposition was
Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329 (1841). In Dana, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts approved the trial court's receipt into evidence of lottery tickets
taken from the defendant's premises pursuant to a search warrant. The court found that
the search was proper, but in dictum, based upon other Massachusetts decisions, stated
that the evidence was admissible regardless of the legality of the search. id. at 337-38.
This dictum was reprinted verbatim by the Supreme Court in Adams and relied upon by
the Court for its conclusion that the propriety of a trial court's use of illegally seized
evidence was well settled. 192 U.S. at 595.
Admissibility of illegally seized evidence was not the rule in every state prior to Adams.
For example, in State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa 164, 96 N.W. 730 (1903), decided one year
before Adams, the Iowa Supreme Court had excluded evidence on the ground that it was
illegally seized.
153. 192 U.S. at 598.
154. See id. at 595-96.
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were never intended to have the effect of excluding illegally obtained but
otherwise competent evidence. 15
5
In Hale v. Henkel,156 the Court distinguished between the order to
produce considered in Boyd and a subpoena duces tecum. It held that
neither the fourth nor the fifth amendments gave a corporate officer the
absolute right to refuse to. produce corporate papers in an antitrust
prosecution, stating:
[W]e do not wish to be understood as holding that a corporation
is not entitled to immunity, under the Fourth Amendment,
against unreasonable searches and seizures. . . .Applying the
test of reasonableness to the present case, we think the subpoe-
na duces tecum is far too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as
reasonable. 157
The Court observed that despite Boyd's language concerning the near
merger of the fourth and fifth amendments, two cases decided subse-
quent to Boyd involving the powers of the courts to aid the Interstate
Commerce Commission in obtaining materials from private parties sub-
ject to its authority 58 had treated the two amendments "as quite distinct,
having different histories, and performing different functions.' 159 Al-
though Hale and the two ICC cases can be read as efforts to accommo-
date the other two branches of the government in their early efforts to
regulate interstate commerce more effectively, it is clear that in Adams
the Court took a much narrower view of the fourth amendment's protec-
tions than it had in Boyd. Nevertheless, in the second decade of the
twentieth century, as the Court faced new forms of law enforcement
aggressiveness, it rediscovered the broader view it had taken in Boyd.
C. Boyd's Progeny-Weeks, Gouled, and Silverthorne
In Weeks v. United States, 16 the Court squarely held for the first time
that a person's materials seized by federal officers in violation of the
fourth amendment could not be used as evidence against him in a federal
prosecution. The illegal search in Weeks which yielded the challenged
155. Id. at 598.
156. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
157. Id. at 76.
158. ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894) (holding that § 12 of the Interstate Commerce
Act (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 12 (1970)), which provides that the Interstate Com-
merce Commission may compel the production of all books, papers, tariffs, contracts,
agreements, and documents relating to any matter under investigation by the Commission,
is constitutional). Accord, ICC v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25 (1904).
159. 201 U.S. at 72.
160. 232 U.S. 383, 386 (1914).
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evidence was carried out by a United States Marshal in concert with
local police officers. At the time of Weeks' arrest at his place of employ-
ment, other officers searched his home without a warrant. Various
lottery tickets and letters written to Weeks with respect to the lottery
were introduced against him at his trial.
The Court announced the exclusionary rule after indulging in an exten-
sive discussion of the fourth amendment principles set forth in Boyd.
The Court was clearly troubled by the "tendency of those who execute
the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of
unlawful seizures and enforced confessions . . .,,;161 these practices
"should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are
charged at all times with the support of the Constitution."1 62 If illegally
seized letters and private documents could be used in a prosecution, the
fourth amendment's declaration against "such searches and seizures is
of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well
be stricken from the Constitution.'1 63
The influence of Boyd was equally obvious in Gouled v. United
States.164 In Gouled the Court established the "mere evidence" rule,
holding that the government could seize only those items in which it had
a possessory interest superior to the defendant's. The Court found it
clear that, "at common law and as the result of the Boyd and Weeks
cases,' 165 search-warrants could not be used "solely for the purpose of
making search to secure evidence to be used against him in a criminal or
penal proceeding." 166
161. Id. at 392.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 393.
164. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
165. Id. at 309.
166. Id. Warrants could be resorted to only when a
primary right to such search and seizure may be found in the interest which the
public or the complainant may have in the property to be seized, or in the right to
possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power renders possession
of the property by the accused unlawful, and provides that it may be taken.
Id.
The Gouled Court saw both the fourth and fifth amendments as forbidding searches for
"mere evidence." The prohibition against searches for mere evidence was a broad one,
not confined merely to papers, which were at issue in Gouled. No items could be seized
from a suspect unless the government had a possessory interest superior to the suspect's.
The value of such items to the government in making a case against their possessor did not
give the government such an interest, regardless of any lack of pecuniary value in these
items. To permit the use against a defendant of items obtained in an unconstitutional
search "would be, in effect, as ruled in the Boyd Case, to compel the defendant to
become a witness against himself." 255 U.S. at 309-12.
Over the years, the -mere evidence" rule has permitted searches only for contraband
and the "fruits" or "instrumentalities" of crime. Illegal drugs, illicit alcohol, and smug-
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A third decision announced during this time made no reference to
Boyd, but should be included with Weeks and Gouled as a case which
gave practical effect to the principles spelled out in Boyd. In Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 67 the Court held that the government
could not take advantage of an illegal search and seizure by photocopy-
ing records it had thus obtained. Silverthorne is significant in that it
contained the Court's first articulation of the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine.168 It is also interesting because of the Court's strong
stand against the government's attempt to circumvent the fourth amend-
ment by means of technological innovation. To allow the government to
do in two steps what it could not do in one, Justice Holmes said in his
opinion for the majority, would be to reduce the fourth amendment "to a
form of words."'169 Thus, during a brief seven-year period, the Court, in
confronting various types of warrantless searches and seizures by feder-
al officials, once more gave the fourth amendment a broad and expansive
reading. The sanctions against aggressive law enforcement announced in
these three cases were to serve as the cornerstone of fourth amendment
decisions in the years to come. However, the Court would soon retreat
from the broad and lofty concept of the fourth amendment announced in
Boyd. 170
gled goods are examples of contraband; "fruits" of a crime consist of anything wrongfully
obtained as a result of the crime; and "instrumentalities" would include items, such as
weapons, which served as the means of committing the crime. For an account of the
difficulties the Court later found with this distinction between mere evidence on the one
hand and contraband or fruits and instrumentalities on the other, see Justice Brennan's
opinion for the Court in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
167. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
168. Id. at 391-92. For further Supreme Court development of this doctrine, see Brown
v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Nardone
v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
169. 251 U.S. at 392.
170. The forty-year period from Gouled to Mapp can be viewed as a single era in the
history of the fourth amendment, one in which the protections of the amendment gradual-
ly atrophied as the Court became increasingly willing to accommodate the demands of
modern federal law enforcement. A closer analysis of the Court's response to perceived
law enforcement needs, however, is better served by dividing this era into two distinct
periods, the first covering the 1920's and '30's and the second the 1940's and early 1950's.
The first of these periods was characterized by the Court's increasingly frequent
scrutiny of investigative law enforcement practices akin to those it had condemned in
Weeks, Silverthorne, and Gouled. Aggressive federal law enforcement may have been
novel and somewhat shocking to the Court in 1914, but by the end of the 1920's it was
routine. As government agents became more sophisticated, the practices scrutinized by
the Court became less easily condemned. The questions the Court began asking itself were
more refined, and less susceptible of a broad general answer. The Court found itself
making a conscientious effort to accommodate the governmental interests served by
prohibition agents and their colleagues. Initially, the Court sought to reconcile these
a..serted interests with the broad historic purpose of the fourth amendment. However, as
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D. The Second Accommodation-The. 1920's and '30's
In the years following Weeks, Gouled, and Silverthorne, the entire
character of federal law enforcement was changing as new federal agen-
cies were created to enforce legislation such as the Mann Act, 171 the
Harrison Narcotic Act, 7 1 the Motor Vehicle Theft Act, 173 and the Vol-
stead Act. 174 The focus of federal law enforcement activities shifted
from the protection of the government's operations and integrity to the
aggressive investigation and prosecution of newly defined criminal activ-
ity. 115 The drastic sanction attached to fourth amendment violations by
the exclusionary rule announced in Weeks made the stakes in fourth
amendment controversies high indeed.
In its search and seizure cases during this period, the Court dealt with
three central issues-the scope of the search incident to arrest exception
to the warrant requirement, the recognition of a "mobility" exception,
and the reach of the fourth amendment to technological innovations such
as wiretapping. The search incident to arrest exception was first men-
tioned only in dictum in Weeks and in Agnello v. United States,'176 a
federal narcotics case which centered on the warrantless search of a
house and seizure of cocaine by state officers. However, three subse-
quent cases over a seven-year period dealt explicitly with whether a
the questions grew more difficult, an alternative method of interpreting the fourth amend-
ment began to emerge: the fourth amendment should not interfere with the public interest
served by vigorous law enforcement. The amendment's history was important, not to
discern the freedoms the amendment was intended to protect, but rather to limit its
application to the kinds of governmental abuses that existed at the time of its adoption.
This alternative mode of fourth amendment interpretation was initially developed and
given its most thoughtful expression by Chief Justice Taft in the 1920's. It came into its
own, however, during the second period of the post-Gouled era, in the 1940's and very
early 1950's, when a tenuous majority applied it in an almost casual manner, allowing
federal agents unprecedented discretion in their battle against different kinds of federally-
defined crimes.
171. 36 Stat. 263 (1910).
172. 38 Stat. 785 (1914).
173. 41 Stat. 324 (1919).
174. National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, tit. II, § 25, 41 Stat. 315 (1919) (repealed 1935). If
the nature of the cases that worked their way up to the Supreme Court during the 1920's
and 30's is an indicator of federal law enforcement efforts, the greatest part of these
efforts went to Volstead Act prosecutions. Certainly the Act was the single greatest
stimulus of fourth amendment development in its time.
175. This observation is substantiated by a cursory examination of these laws and a
comparison of the nature and volume of these cases with cases predating the spate of new
federal criminal legislation. Prior to the criminalization of alcohol and narcotics usage and
the federalization of essentially common-law offenses such as bank robbery and transpor-
tation of stolen vehicles, the relatively few federal prosecutions that made their way into
the official reports were, like those described in Boyd and Hale, mostly of the "white
collar" variety.
176. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
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search incident to arrest was valid. These were Marron v. United
States,'" Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,' 78 and United States
v. Lefkowitz. 179 In each of these cases Justice Butler wrote the opinion
for a unanimous Court, but despite this unanimity and common author-
ship, these three cases are not easily reconciled with each other, as
Justice Stewart emphasized years later in Chimel v. California. 180
The cases presented strikingly similar factual situations. In Marron,
federal prohibition agents had obtained a warrant to search the floor of a
building in which Marron apparently operated a speak-easy. Agents
arrested Marron when they executed the warrant and seized a ledger and
bills described by the Court as a part of Marron's illicit operation. The
ledger and bills had not been named in the warrant. The search which
revealed these items and the resulting seizure was upheld as incident to
Marron's arrest since the items were in Marron's "immediate possession
and control.'1'8 In both Go-Bart and Lefkowitz, federal prohibition
agents obtained warrants to arrest the defendant and made warrantless
searches of the defendant's business premises at the time of arrest. In
Go-Bart, the warrant was held invalid because of an insufficient af-
fidavit, but the arrest was sustained on the ground that the officer had
probable cause to believe that the defendants were committing an of-
fense in their presence. The agents falsely told the president of the
company that they had a search warrant and forced him to unlock and
open his desk and safe. The Supreme Court sustained an injunction
against prosecutorial use of evidence seized in this manner. 182 Boyd and
Weeks were relied upon by Justice Butler for the proposition that the
fourth amendment should be liberally construed. 183 However, he also
opened a Pandora's box for future litigants by declaring: "There is no
formula for the determination of reasonableness. Each case is to be
decided on its own facts and circumstances. '-1 84
177. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
178. 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
179. 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
180. 395 U.S. 752, 755-60 (1969). The thrust of Justice Stewart's observation was that
Marron had elevated dicta from Weeks to a rule that the place where one is arrested may
be searched so long as the arrest is valid. Marron was limited, in Justice Stewart's view,
by the subsequent decisions of the Court in Go-Bart and Lefkowitz, cases in which the
Court invalidated comprehensive searches by the police of the premises in which the
defendants were arrested. The later Supreme Court decisions in Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145 (1947) and United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), in which the
Court rejected the defendants' fourth amendment claims, were similarly dismissed by
Justice Stewart as ill-founded.
181. 275 U.S. at 199.
182. 282 U.S. at 358.
183. Id. at 357.
184. Id.
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In Lefkowitz, the Court appeared to limit the permissible reach of
searches incident to arrest. Unfortunately, Butler's opinion is scarcely a
model of clarity. His observation that the fourth amendment should be
"construed liberally to safeguard the right of privacy' 185 is followed by
the following language:
The authority of officers to search one's house or place of
business contemporaneously with his lawful arrest therein upon
a valid warrant of arrest certainly is not greater than that con-
ferred by a search warrant issued upon adequate proof and
sufficiently describing the premises and the things sought to be
obtained. . . .Security against unlawful searches is more likely
to be attained by resort to search warrants than by reliance upon
the caution and sagacity of petty officers while acting under the
excitement that attends the capture of persons accused of
crime. 186
Implicit in this decision is the limitation that a search incident to arrest
could be used only for evidence of an offense currently being committed.
But the discussion then digressed to the mere evidence rule, 87 and
indeed, this case could be read as based upon the distinction between
mere evidence and those items for which the government is entitled to
search and seize. The concluding paragraph of the opinion contained yet
a third ground as a possible basis; "[a]n arrest may not be used as pre-
text to search for evidence."' 8 8 In the final analysis, it appeared that the
Court was struggling to retain the broad view of the fourth amendment
expressed in Boyd while attempting to adapt nineteenth-century lan-
guage to modern law enforcement activities. Lefkowitz epitomizes the
difficulty that the Court has had in reconciling the broad historical
purpose of the fourth amendment with the particularized and
troublesome problems presented by modern police activity. In Carroll v.
United States, 89 the Court considered for the first time the question of
whether there existed a "mobility" exception to the warrant requirement
permitting a warrantless stop and search of an automobile upon probable
cause that it contained contraband or other seizable materials. The
prohibition agents who stopped Carroll's car on a public highway had
dealt previously with the driver and occupants of the automobile, and the
agents knew from these previous dealings that the suspects were bootleg-
gers. The agents searched the vehicle on the highway where they had
stopped it without a warrant and discovered contraband liquor concealed
185. 285 U.S. at 464.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 465-66.
188. Id. at 467.
189. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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behind the back seat. In holding that such searches did not violate the
fourth amendment, the Court was supported by powerful statutory prec-
edent. The same Congress which had proposed the adoption of the
fourth amendment had also passed legislation setting forth less stringent
warrant requirements for searches of vessels than for searches of build-
ings.190 This law, the 1789 Duty Act, 191 gave the Court a solid foundation
for its decision. Although Chief Justice Taft, in his opinion for the
majority, could have relied on a statutory interpretation, he chose to
address the underlying constitutional issue. In so doing, he gave voice to
a view of the fourth amendment far different from that expressed in
Boyd:
[I]f the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon
probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of
circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile
or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure
and destruction, the search and seizure are valid. The Fourth
Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed
an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in
a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the
interests and rights of individual citizens.192.
According to Taft, the fourth amendment is limited to its historical
setting. This is far different than interpreting the amendment in its
historical context, i.e., attempting to discern the nature of the evil it was
designed to prevent. Rather, in Taft's view, the amendment simply was
not intended to apply to law enforcement activities not contemplated by
the people who drafted it. 193 Moreover, the amendment "is to be con-
strued . . . in a manner which will conserve the public interests as well
as the interests of individual citizens."'" Thus the amendment is to be
subjected to a kind of balancing test, in which the "public" or law
190. That Congress consciously distinguished between the requirements for a search
warrant when goods subject to forfeiture were concealed in a dwelling house and when
they were concealed on a movable vessel was documented in the Court's discussion of
legislation enacted contemporaneously with the promulgation of the fourth and fifth
amendments. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150-51 (1925); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 623-24 (1886).
191. 1 Stat. 29, 43 (1789). This Act authorized the warrantless search for and seizure of
illegally imported goods if found upon any ship or vessel, while a warrant was required to
search for such goods believed to be concealed in a dwelling house, store, or building. Id.
at § 25. Similar provisions contained in legislation passed in the 1790's are listed in Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151 (1925).
192. Id. at 149.
193. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), which held that the warrant-
less wiretapping of telephone conversations of the defendant does not violate the fourth
amendment proscription against illegal searches and seizures.
194. 267 U.S. at 149.
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enforcement interests are placed on one side of the scale and those of the
individual who is the object of the search are placed on the other. Since
the fourth amendment's constraints on government power to invade the
individual's privacy are balanced against the public interest, the public
and the individual are viewed as possessing directly conflicting inter-
ests.
195
Chief Justice Taft's static view of the fourth amendment found further
expression in Olmstead v. United States. 196 Olmstead was the leader of a
liquor-smuggling conspiracy. Prohibition officers placed taps on his tele-
phone line without trespassing on his property. The lines were tapped,
and the intercepted conversations were transcribed for a period of sever-
al months. A five-four majority held that conversations passing over
telephone wires do not come within the protection of the fourth amend-
ment. After a discussion of Boyd, Weeks, Silverthorne, and Gouled, Taft
found that these cases emphasized "the misuse of governmental power
195. Two automobile searches which might be described as "follow-ups" to Carroll
are more notable for the factual setting of the warrantless searches upheld by the Court
than for their contribution to fourth amendment jurisprudence. Relying on Carroll, both
cases approved searches going beyond the Carroll search in certain respects and dismis-
sed the fourth amendment contentions in a rather offhanded manner. The first of these
cases was Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931) which also involved prohibition
agents previously acquainted with the targets of their search. The officers had on an
earlier occasion arrested Husty for bootlegging offenses. On the day of the search in
question, they received a tip from a "reliable informer" that Husty was back in business.
His vehicle was parked and unoccupied at the time the officers searched it. The Court had
little difficulty upholding this warrantless search:
The search was not unreasonable because, as petitioners argue, sufficient time
elapsed between the receipt by the officer of the information and the search of
the car to have enabled him to procure a search warrant. He could not know when
Husty would come to the car or how soon it would be removed. In such
circumstances we do not think the officers should be required to speculate upon
the chances of successfully carrying out the search, after the delay and withdraw-
al from the scene of one or more officers which would have been necessary to
procure a warrant. The search was, therefore, on probable cause, and not un-
reasonable; and the motion to suppress the evidence was rightly denied.
Id. at 701.
In Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938), the prohibition agents obtained the
information in a manner similar to that in Husty, although it was not clear whether the
suspected bootleggers were previously known to the officers. After brief references to
Carroll, Husty, and Agnello, the Court simply concluded:
[lI]t seems plain enough that just before he entered the garage the following
officers properly could have stopped petitioner's car, made search and put him
under arrest. So much was not seriously controverted at the argument.
Passage of the car into the open garage closely followed by the observing
officer did not destroy this right. No search was made of the garage. Examination
of the automobile accompanied an arrest, without objection and upon admission
of probable guilt. The officers did nothing either unreasonable or oppressive.
Id. at 255.
196. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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of compulsion . . . . The Amendment itself shows that the search is to
be of material things-the person, the house, his papers or his ef-
fects." 197 The amendment had no application to the wiretapping. "There
was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by
the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry of the
houses or offices of the defendants.' 98 Recalling his admonition in
Carroll that the amendment "is to be construed in the light of what was
deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted,"' 99
Taft found no case authority to support a fourth amendment violation
absent an official search and seizure of the "person, . . . his papers or
his tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house
'or curtilage' for the purpose of making a seizure." 2°°
Taft's Olmstead opinion, even more than Carroll, reflects a rather
ambiguous and lukewarm attitude toward the exclusionary rule, and an
avowed intention to evade the rule by curbing the fourth amendment.
Although the Chief Justice acknowledged that the Court's recent deci-
sions required application of the exclusionary rule, these decisions "can
not justify enlargement of the language employed" in the amendment in
such a way as to inhibit modern law enforcement.20 ' Olmstead and
Carroll are significant for reasons beyond their specific holdings. Read
together, they support the proposition that the fourth amendment's
coverage was limited to the kinds of governmental abuses practiced at
the time the amendment was adopted. More important, however, they
established a balancing test, which included the public interests served
by effective law enforcement. To this extent, the fourth amendment and
its exclusionary rule were viewed as obstacles to effective law enforce-
ment, and as such should not be given interpretations which would
further hamper police activities. 20 2
E. Fall From Grace-The 1940's and '50's
The period following World War II marked a low point in the devel-
opment of the fourth amendment. Although not all of the Court's opin-
ions reflected the modest fourth amendment vision of Olmstead, the
197. Id. at 463-64.
198. Id. at 464.
199. Id. at 465.
200. Id. at 466.
201. Id. at 465.
202. Oimstead is also famous for the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis. It is a
classic discourse on the meaning and purpose of the fourth amendment. His major thesis
is that the amendment was not intended to be limited to the "necessarily simple" forms of
intrusion available to governments at the time it was adopted. Id. at 471, 473-74. A
constitutional provision, he emphasized, cannot be applied simply on the basis of what has
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Court was so closely and bitterly divided during this period that what was
good law one term was apt to be overruled the next. During this period
law enforcement officers were granted virtually unbridled discretion to
search an entire residence or office "incident" to an arrest on the
premises and the issue of probable cause was treated almost casually. In
Davis v. United States,203 a black marketeering case immediately follow-
ing World War II, the Court turned the mere evidence rule inside out to
uphold an outrageous invasion of an individual's place of business on the
theory that the object of the search, gasoline coupons, belonged to the
government. In Goldman v. United States ,20 the Court reaffirmed its
Olmstead position that electronic intrusion without trespass is not a
"search, ' 20 5 and in Brinegar v. United States, 206 it refused to halt the
growing abuses of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
Moreover, in three search incident to arrest cases, Harris v. United
States ,27 Trupiano v. United States ,208 and United States v.
Rabinowitz,2°9 the Court constructed a monument to judicial inconsis-
tency. 210 These cases all involved federal officers and factual patterns
similar to those of the cases in the 1920's and '30's. The kinds of law
enforcement activities that the Court had scrutinized at the end of the
1930's had not changed markedly, but the Court's view of the require-
ments placed upon law enforcement officials by the fourth amendment
had changed, and the Court appeared extremely willing to approve any
law enforcement conduct that it deemed "reasonable."
been; its application must include new conditions as well. "Time and again, this court, in
giving effect to the principle underlying the fourth amendment, has refused to place an
unduly literal construction upon it." Id. at 476.
203. 328 U.S. 582 (1946).
204. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
205. See id. at 133-36.
206. 338 U.S. 160 (1949). A majority of the Court upheld the actions of Treasury
Officers in giving chase to the heavily loaded car of a known moonshiner and in searching
the car at the conclusion of a high-speed chase. The majority and dissenting opinions both
focused on the officers' probable cause to arrest Brinegar. The majority found the facts
similar to those which were held to constitute probable cause in Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925). See id. at 164-78. Justice Jackson, joined in dissent by Justices
Frankfurter and Murphy, regarded the decision "as an extension of the Carroll case,
which already has been too much taken by law enforcement officers as blanket authority
to stop and search cars on suspicion." 338 U.S. at 183 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice
Jackson did touch on the failure of the officers to obtain a warrant, observing that the
agents in Carroll had congressional authority to make a warrantless search and the
officers here did not. Id.
207. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
208. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
209. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
210. At the outset it is helpful to note that sharp divisions among the Justices over
fourth amendment issues were legion during this period. A sudden proliferation of five-
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The Court's abandonment of virtually all limitations that might have
been thought to exist concerning searches incident to arrest is chronicled
vividly in the first case decided in this period, Harris v. United States.211
FBI agents searched an entire four-room apartment "incident" to the
defendant's arrest. During the course of this search, the agents dis-
covered stolen draft cards. The majority opinion by Chief Justice Vin-
son, after a rather perfunctory quotation from Gouled regarding the
importance of the fourth amendment rights to constitutional liberty,
stated that
[t]his Court has also pointed out that it is only unreasonable
searches and seizures which come within the constitutional in-
terdict . ..
The Fourth Amendment has never been held to require that
every valid search and seizure be effected under the authority of
a search warrant. Search and seizure incident to lawful arrest is
a practice of ancient origin and has long been an integral part of
the law-enforcement procedures of the United States and of the
individual states. 212
Finding nothing in the Court's previous decisions that precluded a
search of rooms other than the one in which the person was arrested,
Vinson took the "immediate control" language of the 1920's and '30's
and equated "control" with "possession" in the common law sense of
ownership or occupancy:
Nor can support be found for the suggestion that the search
could not validly extend beyond the room in which petitioner
was arrested. . . . Other situations may arise in which the
nature and size of the object sought or the lack of effective
control over the premises on the part of the persons arrested
may require that the searches be less extensive. But the area
which reasonably may be subjected to search is not to be deter-
mined by the fortuitous circumstance that the arrest took place
in the living room as contrasted to some other room of the
apartment." 3
The extent to which law enforcement needs had gained ascendancy over
"rights of privacy and personal security" was further illustrated by
Vinson's explanation that, because a man's papers and records can be
more easily concealed than, say, an illegal still, a warrantless search for
four or five-three decisions, at a time when there also were some changes in the Court's
composition, may account for the instability in the results the Court reached and the wild
inconsistency between the majority opinions of one term with those of the next.
211. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
212. Id. at 150-51.
213. Id. at 152.
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these papers would necessarily have to be more intrusive than a search
for the still. 214
A different five-four majority came up with a contrary view of the
warrant requirement the following year, due largely to a change in
position by Justice Douglas. In Trupiano v. United States21 the Court
held that the fourth amendment had been violated by a warrantless
governmental destruction of a moonshining operation previously infil-
trated by government agents. In this regard, the facts were distin-
guishable from Harris, and smacked more of government outlawry than
the FBI's calculated overstepping in Harris. The extent of the intrusion
itself, however, was far less. One of the still operators was arrested at
the still, and the still, along with several vats of mash and 262 cans of
alcohol, were seized at about the same time. While the Court distin-
guished Harris-an opinion from which four of its five members had
dissented-Justice Murphy also sought to contain the incident to arrest
exception:
A search or seizure without a warrant as an incident to a
lawful arrest has always been considered to be a strictly limited
right. It grows out of the inherent necessities of the situation at
the time of the arrest. But there must be something more in the
way of necessity than merely a lawful arrest. . . . [T]here must
be some other factor in the situation that would make it un-
reasonable or impracticable to require the arresting officer to
equip himself with a search warrant. 2
16
Justice Murphy's opinion in Trupiano relied heavily on Johnson v.
United States,2 7 another five-four majority opinion written earlier in the
Term by Justice Jackson. In Johnson, Seattle police officers made a
warrantless entry of an opium suspect's motel room after approaching
the room pursuant to a tip. The officers detected the odor of burning
opium in the hallway and proceeded to knock on the door. When a
woman opened the door, they promptly arrested her. Although the
government tried to justify the arrest and ensuing search on an incident
to arrest basis, Justice Jackson noted that the officers had ample oppor-
tunity to obtain a warrant and emphasized that mere inconvenience is no
ground for not doing so. If a warrant was not required here, he observed,
"it is difficult to think of the case in which it should be required." 218
214. Id.
215. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
216. Id. at 708-709.
217. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
218. Id. at 15. The opinion in Johnson also employed a "balancing" approach to the
fourth amendment and in so doing, spawned subsequent decisions which excused a
variety of warrantless and intrusive law enforcement activities. Id.
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The four dissenters wrote no opinions in Johnson although they did so
in Trupiano,219 reaffirming their belief that the fourth amendment had
been set in concrete at the time of its adoption. This view, and the
generous view of "possession and control" that underlay the Harris
result, prevailed just two years later in United States v. Rabinowitz.220 In
a five-three opinion, the Court flatly overruled Trupiano and left the
warrant requirement a shadow of its former self. In Rabinowitz, follow-
ing a brief discourse on the right of officers to search places as well as
persons incident to arrest, and the unavailability of any "litmus-paper"
test for determining the reasonableness of a search or seizure, 221 the
Court abandoned necessity as a prerequisite to a warrantless search.
Upholding an intensive search of a forgery defendant's office as incident
to the defendant's arrest, Justice Minton, the majority spokesman, made
the following observations:
A rule of thumb requiring that a search warrant always be
procured whenever practicable may be appealing from the van-
tage point of easy administration. But we cannot agree that this
requirement should be crystallized into a sine qua non to the
reasonableness of a search . . . . Some flexibility will be ac-
corded law officers engaged in daily battle with criminals for
whose restraint criminal laws are essential.
It is appropriate to note that the Constitution does not say that
the right of the people to be secure in their persons should not be
violated without a search warrant if it is practicable for the
officers to procure one. The mandate of the Fourth Amendment
is that the people shall be secure against unreasonable searches.
It is not disputed that there may be reasonable searches, inci-
dent to an arrest, without a search warrant. 222
Justice Frankfurter dissented in Davis, Harris, and Rabinowitz. Ta-
ken together, his dissenting opinions form the most definitive exposition
on the meaning and purposes of the fourth amendment ever offered by a
member of the Court. 223 In Davis, Frankfurter reacted strongly to the
Court's argument that because of the nature of the items sought (gasoline
coupons "belonging" to the government), 224 the site of the search (a
business rather than a home), 225 the time of the search (during business
219. See 334 U.S. at 710-16 (Vinson, C.J., joined by Black, Reed, and Burton, JJ.).
220. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
221. Id. at 63.
222. Id. at 65.
223. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68-86 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 155-82 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 594-623 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
224. 328 U.S. at 588-92.
225. Id. at 592.
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hours), 226 and the lack of any coercion in obtaining consent, 227 the search
was therefore reasonable. 228 He argued that this decision marked a major
departure from the mainstream of the Court's prior fourth amendment
decisions and supported his position with a devastating analysis of the
majority opinion. 229 Moreover, he explained the meaning of the fourth
amendment in the context of its history-the British and colonial experi-
ence that led to its adoption, the evils it was intended to prevent, the
broad and liberal interpretation given it in past opinions of the Court, and
its vital role in the maintenance of a free society. 230 The essence of his
dissent is distilled brilliantly in this paragraph:
The course of decision in this Court has thus far jealously
enforced the principle of a free society secured by the prohibi-
tion of unreasonable searches and seizures. Its safeguards are
not to be worn away by a process of devitalizing interpretation.
The approval given today to what was done by arresting officers
in this case indicates that we are in danger of forgetting that the
Bill of Rights reflects experience with police excesses. It is not
only under Nazi rule that police excesses are inimical to free-
dom. It is easy to make light of insistence on scrupulous regard
for the safeguards of civil liberties when invoked on behalf of
the unworthy. It is too easy. History bears testimony that by
such disregard are the rights of liberty extinguished, heedlessly
at first, then stealthily, and brazenly in the end. 23
Frankfurter's dissent in Davis was a conscious extension of Justice
Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead.232 Boyd, Gouled, and Silverthorne are
226. Id.
227. Id. at 593. The Court characterized as "persuasion" the agents' conduct in
obtaining the owner's "consent" to search the room in which the coupons ultimately were
seized. Id. In light of the "persuading" agent's own testimony and other uncontroverted
testimony by the defendant, the conduct might better be described as "coercion." The
agent testified that he asked the defendant to unlock the room and that the defendant
refused. However, when another agent outside the gas station shone a light through the
window of the room and attempted to enter the room through that window, the owner
unlocked the door and "consented" to the search. Id. at 586-87.
228. Id. at 593-94. See also 412 U.S. at 219, 222, 233. Justice Stewart employed a
"totality of the circumstances" test in Bustamonte which differed significantly from the
"totality" test employed here by Justice Douglas. The Bustamonte test went to the
voluntariness of the consent itself; that is, whether or not the consent was based on free
will. In Davis, Justice Douglas seemed to be saying that the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the search somehow expanded "the permissible limits of persuasion" avail-
able to the agents.
229. 328 U.S. at 594-603 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 604-13.
231. Id. at 597.
232. 277 U.S. at 471-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In fact, the heart of Justice Brandeis'
dissent in Oimstead was quoted by Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in Davis. See 328
U.S. at 607-09 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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the mainstream of the Court's fourth amendment interpretation. Olm-
stead and Marron are short-lived deviations. 233 Congress, as well as the
Court, has been reluctant to expand government search powers-even
when urged to do so by an eager executive branch. 234 The states, as well
as the federal legislative and judicial branches, have shown a keen
awareness of the need to limit governmental search power. 235 Neverthe-
less, there are constant pressures to whittle away at the freedoms the
fourth amendment and its state counterparts were designed to protect.
236
The law enforcement interest asserted-the need to catch and punish
criminals like Davis, Harris, and Rabinowitz-must not be allowed to
weaken the fourth amendment's demanding standards.
237
Justice Jackson also dissented from Harris and Rabinowitz, but on a
more limited basis-that close judicial scrutiny, in the form of warrants
and tough appellate oversight, is necessary to keep federal officers from
encroaching on the privacy and security interests protected by the fourth
amendment. 238 The courts see only the tip of the iceberg of abusive
police practices, he warned, and the exclusionary rule must be unspar-
ingly applied at the federal level to discourage these practices. 239 Jack-
son's dissents, nevertheless, evinced a willingness to allow for accom-
233. Id. at 609, 612-13 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 606, 616-23. See also Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 162-63 (1947)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
235. This conclusion is implicit in Justice Frankfurter's description of the narrow
exceptions to the warrant requirement recognized by the states. See 328 U.S. at 609.
Contrasted with Justice Frankfurter's support of the states' approach is his scathing
criticism of the lower federal courts for their "casual and uncritical application" of the
search incident to arrest doctrine. Id. at 610-12. In his Harris dissent, Frankfurter also
approved of the states' protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. See 331
U.S. at 160-62 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
236. See Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 614-16 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing). See also Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 171-73 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
237. It is too often felt, though not always avowed, that what is called nice observ-
ance of these constitutional safeguards makes apprehension and conviction of
violators too difficult. Want of alertness and enterprise on the part of the law
enforcers too often is the real obstruction to law enforcement. The present case
affords a good instance. ...
The Court in this case gives a new label to an old practice and to an old claim by
police officials. But it happens that the old practice and the old claim now
refurbished in a new verbal dress were the very practice and claim which infring-
ed liberty as conceived by those who framed the Constitution and against which
they erected the barriers of the Fourth Amendment.
328 U.S. at 614-15 (footnote omitted).
238. See Harris v United States, 331 U.S. 145, 196-98 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
See also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181-83 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting);
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
239. 338 U.S. at 181 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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modations of legitimate law enforcement interests and left room for a
"balancing" approach. When the fourth amendment enjoyed a'renais-
sance in the 1960's, it was the spirit of the Jackson opinions, more than
the Frankfurter treatises, which animated the Court. Ironically, howev-
er, this same balancing approach would ultimately lead to cutbacks in the
amendment's protection by accommodating newly perceived law en-
forcement needs.
The Court's retreat from its initial stand against aggressive federal law
enforcement activity, which began with the cautious adaptation of fourth
amendment principles in Marron, Go-Bart, and Lefkowitz, concluded
with a rout in Rabinowitz and left the fourth amendment in considerable
disarray. Throughout this period there was one constant-governmental
pressure to give law enforcement agents discretion that strict adherence
to the Boyd-Weeks-Gouled view of the fourth amendment would have
denied them. The Court's decisions over the four decades separating
Gouled and Mapp are characterized by an increasing willingness to
approve of law enforcement interests by relaxing fourth amendment
standards. In Marron, Go-Bart, and Lefkowitz, the Court attempted to
accommodate those interests while adhering to the basic precepts of
Boyd, Weeks, and Gouled. In Carroll, and to a greater extent in Olin-
stead, the Court departed from Boyd and its progeny and constructed an
alternative theory of the fourth amendment that made this accommoda-
tion of law enforcement interests an easy task. The Court's postwar
decisions illustrate just how easy this task could become once the Court
gained some familiarity with federal law enforcement practices which at
first had seemed novel and dangerous. The Court's original perception of
the fourth amendment, although preserved in the dissenting opinions of
Justice Frankfurter, was largely dormant during this time. However,
during the 1960's, as a result of the Court's exposure to abusive searches
and seizures at the state level, this dormant original perception was
"born again."
F. The Winds of Change: Wolf, Rochin, Elkins, and Mapp
In 1949, in Wolf v. Colorado,240 the Court held that the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause should protect precisely the same pri-
vacy interests as were protected by the fourth amendment. 241 "The
240. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
241. Justice Frankfurter's view should be contrasted with the view held by a vocal
minority of the Court at that time, led by Justice Black, that all the guarantees of the Bill
of Rights were embodied in the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 39-40 (1949) (Black, J., concurring); Adamson v. California, 332 U-.S. 46, 68-92
(1947) (Black, J., dissenting). The first Supreme Court proponent of the theory thatth'e
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security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which
is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society,"
Justice Frankfurter wrote for the majority. "It is therefore implicit in
'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause. 2 42 The manner of enforcing this
right was another matter. The Court was unwilling to require the states to
apply the exclusionary rule, which had been judicially fashioned to deal
with federal officers' violations of the fourth amendment, to violations
of rights protected by the fourteenth amendment. 243 Although the Wolf
Court held that the right of privacy was enforceable against the states,
the exclusionary rule was viewed as only one possible means of protect-
ing that right. 2" Exclusion from a criminal prosecution of illegally seized
but otherwise competent evidence was not considered essential by a
majority of the states, Frankfurter observed; of the forty-seven that had
considered applying the exclusionary rule, only seventeen had adopted
it, while thirty declined to follow the Supreme Court's lead in Weeks.245
This rejection by the states weighed heavily in the Court's reasoning,
especially since the case for the exclusionary rule appeared stronger at
Bill of Rights had been "incorporated" into the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause and thereby made applicable to the states was, ironically, the elder Justice Harlan.
See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114-27 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 538-58 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Court has never
adopted the position that the Bill of Rights provisions were incorporated wholesale by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Rather, the Court has applied most of
those provisions to the states in a piecemeal fashion.
242. 338 U.S. at 27-28.
243. In support of this proposition, Justice Frankfurter in Wolf briefly reviewed the
origin of the exclusionary rule and the treatment given the rule by the states. He pointed
out that the rule as formulated in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), was the
product of judicial inference rather than legislative or fourth amendment guarantees. 338
U.S. at 28. Thus, the states were free to adopt or reject the rule, in his judgment, since
there was no fourth amendment proscription to be extended to the states by the fourteenth
amendment. Justice Frankfurter's research demonstrated further that the states over-
whelmingly had chosen different sanctions and afforded protections other than exclusion
of the relevant evidence when government officers had illegally seized the evidence. Id. at
28-39.
244. Two years earlier, in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), Justice Frankfur-
ter had written a concurrence rebutting the theory that the due process clause "incor-
porated" the Bill of Rights. 332 U.S. at 59 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Several times
previously the Court similarly had declined to adopt the incorporation theory or its less
ambitious offspring, selective incorporation. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78
(1908); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). See also note 241 supra. Although
certain rights protected by the Bill of Rights had been held enforceable against the states
as required by the fourteenth amendment, these rights had been considered essential to
the concept of ordered liberty. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 237 (1960)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
245. 338 U.S. at 33-39 (Appendix to Opinion of the Court).
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the federal level than at the state or local level. Accordingly, the Wolf
Court held that in a state court prosecution for state crime the fourteenth
amendment did not require the exclusion of evidence obtained by an
unreasonable search and seizure.2" s
The Wolf decision signaled the beginning of Supreme Court review,
through the due process clause, of state search and seizure practices.
Five decades had passed since the Court had considered a state court
decision on a search and seizure issue, 247 but only three years after Wolf,
the Court again confronted a state practice in Rochin v. California .21 In
Rochin, the Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment forbids use in a state prosecution of certain evidence ob-
tained by state or local police conduct which "shocks the con-
science. ' 249 In 1960, the Court further extended federal control over
state searches and seizures. In Elkins v. United States,25 a five-four
majority forbade the use in federal prosecutions of evidence seized by
state officers engaging in conduct that did not not comport with fourth
amendment standards. Thus the Court ended what had come to be called
the "silver platter" doctrine. The Court, per Justice Stewart, noted that
the watershed case which led to the demise of this doctrine was Wolf v.
Colorado,2 51 although this point was vigorously disputed by Justice
Frankfurter,252 the author of the Wolf opinion. Wolf, according to Jus-
tice Stewart, abandoned the "foundation upon which the admissibility of
state-seized evidence in a federal trial originally rested-that unreason-
able state searches did not violate the Federal Constitution .... ,,253
Moreover, Stewart continued, the exclusionary rule had proved work-
able on both the federal and the state level; "[t]he movement towards the
rule of exclusion has been halting but seemingly inexorable. 2 54 By this
time, at least half of the states had adopted some kind of exclusionary
rule .255
246. Wolf v. United States, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
247. See Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904). State officers participated in the
challenged searches and seizures in Weeks v. United States and other federal prosecu-
tions.
248. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
249. Id. at 169, 172. In separate concurring opinions Justices Black and Douglas
criticized the majority for the amorphous and potentially abusive standard it had promul-
gated in outlawing the particular police conduct involved in the instant case. Id. at 175-77
(Black, J., concurring); Id. 177-79 (Douglas, J., concurring).
250. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
251. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
252. 364 U.S. at 233, 237-42 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 213.
254. Id. at 219 (footnote omitted).
255. See id. at 224-25 (Appendix to Opinion of the Court).
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The Elkins decision, as Justice Frankfurter's dissent aptly demon-
strated, brought the Court closer to the position that the exclusionary
rule applies to state as well as federal searches and seizures. In simply
stating that evidence seized in violation of the federal constitution was
inadmissible in a federal court, regardless of the particular provisions
violated, the Court also blurred or eliminated the distinction, so carefully
drawn in Wolf, between the scope and effect of the fourth and four-
teenth amendments. Justice Frankfurter emphasized this point in his
Elkins dissent, writing that not every technical violation of the fourth
amendment should run afoul of the fundamental standards "of civilized
conduct on which applications of the Due Process Clause turn." 256 But
nothing in Elkins hinted at the fateful step the Court was to take the next
Term, when in Mapp v. Ohio,2 57 the Court applied the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule to state court prosecutions. 258
Wolf had assured the Court of a constant stream of petitions beckon-
ing its attention to allegedly abusive state search and seizure practices.
Thus the Court's attention was drawn to an area of law enforcement
activity that it had rarely considered in previous Terms, and then only in
connection with cases brought in federal court. 259 The state law enforce-
ment abuses considered by the Court in several of these cases-Rochin,
Irvine v. California ,260 and Mapp itself-were flagrant indeed. In Mapp,
police officers, having been denied access to the suspect's home, forc-
ibly broke in to seize items allegedly violative of Ohio's obscenity stat-
ute. Justice Clark's opinion for the Court displayed a strong reaction
against such police abuses which had gone unchecked by state courts.
Clark's conception of the fourth amendment was grand indeed. The
tenor of the first part of his Mapp opinion reflects a reverence for the
fourth amendment missing from majority opinions since Weeks, Silver-
256. Id. at 239 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
257. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
258. Above all, the Elkins decision was confined to the federal courts. The distinction
between fourth amendment violations and fourteenth amendment violations was preserv-
ed. As Justice Frankfurter pointed out, the Court's opinion refers to state practices which
would violate the fourth amendment if committed by a federal officer. 364 U.S. at 244
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). While Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, referred with
approval to gradual state court acceptance of an exclusionary rule for illegally seized
evidence, his opinion in no way intimated that this rule should be made binding on the
states through the Federal Constitution. Although frequently cited in Mapp, the Elkins
decision simply was not a bridge from Weeks, Wolf, Rochin, or any other decision to the
result reached in Mapp.
259. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20 (1925); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
260. 347 U.S. 128 (1954). In Irvine a five-four majority of the Court held that a
conviction based upon police testimony concerning the substance of incriminating conver-
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thorne, and Gouled. Indeed, much of this part of the opinion consisted
of quotations from Boyd, Weeks, and Silverthorne. But Clark's rever-
ence was not confined to the fourth amendment, or even primarily
directed to it. Rather, he was seeking to invest the exclusionary rule with
constitutional sanctity.
The breadth of the fourth amendment protections expressed in Boyd,
the need expressed in Weeks to effectuate the amendment's broad pur-
poses by excluding unconstitutionally seized evidence from federal pros-
ecutions, and Justice Holmes' admonition in Silverthorne that without
the rule the amendment would simply be "a form of words," '2 61 out-
weighed the Court's occasional "passing references to the Weeks rule
as one of evidence." 262 To the extent that the Wolf Court's refusal to
impose the federal exclusionary sanction on the states rested on factual
considerations, said Clark, Wolf had been undermined. The states them-
selves no longer rejected the exclusionary rule. In the dozen years since
Wolf, "more than half of those since passing upon it, by their own
legislative or judicial decision, have wholly or partly adopted or adhered
to the Weeks rule." 26 3 The Court also noted that the California Supreme
Court's conclusion in People v. Cahan, 264 that alternative remedies for
illegal searches and seizures were worthless, was "buttressed by the
experience of other States. "265
The pressure felt by the Court to apply the exclusionary rule uniformly
in the nation's courts was evident in Clark's reference to "a plea made
here Term after Term that we overturned [the Wolf] doctrine on applica-
bility of the Weeks exclusionary rulei' 266 The Court was not so much
overruling Wolf as it was acting consistently with Wolf's perceptions in
light of the dozen years of experience since it was decided; Clark empha-
sized:
Today we once again examine Wolf's constitutional documenta-
tion of the right to privacy free from unreasonable state intru-
sion, and, after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to
close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence se-
cured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic
sations overheard by the police via use of a hidden microphone did not violate the
fourteenth amendment, even though entrance to plant the listening device had been
secured by the police with the aid of a locksmith and without a warrant.
261. 251 U.S. at 392.
262. 367 U.S. at 649. Despite these references, Justice Clark said, "the plain and
unequivocal language of Weeks-and its later paraphrase in Wolf-to the effect that the
Weeks rule is of constitutional origin, remains entirely undisturbed." Id.
263. Id. at 651.
264. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
265. 367 U.S. 643, 652.
266. Id. at 654.
[Vol. 27:9
Decline of the Fourth Amendment
right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that
very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained
by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by
that same authority, inadmissible in a state court. 267
While this holding was considered a logical extension of Wolf, in
reality it was something else altogether. Clark's explanation, that if the
work begun in Wolf were to be completed, the Court must now do for
state defendants what it had done for federal defendants in Weeks,
rested on the complete obliteration of Wolf's finely drawn distinction
between the scope and purpose of the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments. No longer was the due process clause viewed as protecting the
privacy right at the core of the fourth amendment. "Since the Fourth
Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth," Clark said
simply, "it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion
as is used against the Federal Government." 268
This misconstruction of Wolf left the Court free to overrule that
decision while purporting to follow it. Furthermore, the Court accepted
without acknowledgment a key element of the "incorporation" theory-
that rights protected by the due process clause against state encroach-
ment are precisely the same as corresponding rights enumerated in the
Bill of Rights. Although the Court did not expressly hold that the fourth
amendment's protections were precisely the same in state and federal
prosecutions for another two years, 269 this conclusion was clearly im-
plicit in Mapp.
Clark went on to explain that an exclusionary sanction against the
states for illegal searches and seizures was just as necessary to protect
the right announced in Wolf as was the exclusionary rule announced in
Weeks to the enforcement of the fourth amendment in federal prosecu-
tions. He did not explain why the exclusionary rule announced in Rochin
was inadequate; instead, he analogized to cases in which the Court had
held that use of a coerced confession against a state defendant violated
the due process clause. 270 Although the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination had not been held applicable to the states, the Court's
analogy between the exclusion of coerced confessions and exclusion of
the fruits of illegal searches and seizures provided a tacit endorsement of
the interrelationship of the fourth and fifth amendment:
We find that, as to the Federal Government, the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments and, as to the States, the freedom from
267. Id. at 654-55.
268. Id. at 655.
269. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1%3).
270. 367 U.S. at 655-56.
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unconscionable invasions of privacy and the freedom from con-
victions based upon coerced confessions do enjoy an "intimate
relation" . . . . The philosophy of each Amendment and of
each freedom is complementary to, although not dependent
upon, that of the other in its sphere of influence-the very least
that together they assure in either sphere is that no man is to be
convicted on unconstitutional evidence .271
Avoidance of needless conflicts between state and federal courts was
also cited as a good reason for a uniform exclusionary rule. "Federal-
state cooperation in the solution of crime under constitutional standards
will be promoted, if only by recognition of their now mutual obligation to
respect the same fundamental criteria in their approaches." 272 Finally,
Clark emphasized the "imperatives of judicial integrity;"2 3 this con-
sideration, he implied, outweighed the arguments built on Judge Car-
dozo's observation in Defore that "[tihe criminal is to go free because
the constable blundered. 2 74 In closing, Clark delivered the following
panegyric: "Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the
individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to
the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is
entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true
administration of justice. 275
It is evident that Clark's opinion in Mapp was based on several
different considerations; it is not so clear, however, which of these
considerations was essential to the actual holding, especially because the
Clark opinion had the unqualified support of only four Justices. The
crucial fifth vote was cast by Justice Black. Although a wholehearted
disciple of the incorporation theory, Justice Black was not so devoted to
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. He stated he was unpersuaded
that
the Fourth Amendment, standing alone, would be enough to bar
the introduction into evidence against an accused of papers and
effects seized from him in violation of its commands ...
[But] when the Fourth Amendment's ban against unreasonable
searches and seizures is considered together with the Fifth
Amendment's ban against compelled self-incrimination, a con-
stitutional basis emerges which not only justifies but actually
requires the exclusionary rule.
276
271. Id. at 656-57 (footnote omitted).
272. Id. at 658.
273. Id. at 659, quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
274. 367 U.S. at 659, quoting People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587
(1926).
275. 367 U.S. at 660.
276. Id. at 661-62 (Black, J., concurring). The idea that the privilege against self-
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The four dissenting justices would have reversed Mapp's conviction
on the ground that the obscenity possession statute under which she had
been convicted was unconstitutional; this had been her principal ground
in the Ohio courts as well as in her petition for certiorari. Justice Stewart
agreed with Justice Harlan, who wrote the principal dissent, that this
case was not an appropriate one "for re-examining Wolf."' 277 Beyond
this, Justice Harlan also provided several arguments against the decision
on its merits. Not only did the state courts appear to rely heavily upon
Wolf, but the frequency with which petitions challenging state searches
and seizures were being filed with the Court indicated that "the issue
which is now being decided may well have untoward practical ramifica-
tions respecting state cases long since disposed of in reliance on Wolf,
and that were we determined to re-examine that doctrine we would not
lack future opportunity. "278
Harlan defended Wolf as announcing a sounder constitutional doctrine
than the one propounded in Mapp, but of particular interest is his
argument that the Court was disregarding special and varying law en-
forcement problems faced by the different states:
For us the question remains, as it has always been, one of state
power, not one of passing judgment on the wisdom of one state
course or another. In my view this Court should continue to
forbear from fettering the States with an adamant rule which
may embarrass them in coping with their own peculiar problems
in criminal law enforcement.2 79
incrimination is implicated in the use of evidence wrongfully seized from a defendant was,
of course, present in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), and was stated in Entick
v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765), which was decided before the fourth and
fifth amendments were adopted. However, a reading of the Weeks opinion does not seem
to indicate that the exclusionary rule depends upon the interaction between the fourth and
fifth amendments as perceived in Boyd. Rather, the need for a deterrent to unconstitu-
tional police practices and the imperative of judicial integrity seemed foremost in the
Court's mind. See 232 U.S. at 392-94.
Unlike Justice Black's concurrence, Justice Douglas' concurring opinion said nothing
which would render Mapp directly vulnerable to any subsequent refusal to recognize the
fourth-fifth amendment interrelationship. However, his opinion did stress the kind of evil
with which the court was dealing here-'"the casual arrogance of those who have the
untrammelled power to invade one's home and to seize one's person." 367 U.S. at 671.
Justice Douglas' reference to the police outrage that transpired in Mapp raises the
question of whether the exclusionary sanction of the fourteenth amendment announced in
Rochin would not be sufficient to deal with the illegality at issue here. Highly critical of
Wolf, Justice Douglas did not even mention Rochin. Indeed, the flagrantly illegal, forcible
police entry of Ms. Mapp's home and the forcible seizure of evidence from her person
would seem to be precisely the kind of activity that would render evidence inadmissible
under Wolf and Rochin.
277. 367 U.S. at 672 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
278. Id. at 676 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 681.
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Harlan's warning about the undue consequences of Mapp was merely
the first in a series of observations he was to make about the difficulties
caused by this decision.
Harlan noted that in Wolf, the Court did not hold that the fourth
amendment itself was enforceable against the states; instead, it was held
that the fourteenth amendment applied only to the "principal of pri-
vacy" at the core of the fourth amendment. It would indeed be a
disservice to the fourteenth amendment if the Court were merely stretch-
ing the general principle of individual privacy to fit "a Procrustean bed
of federal precedent under the Fourth Amendment.' '280 Harlan contend-
ed that Mapp did not reverse a determination of constitutionality-the
state assumed that the search was unconstitutional. Instead, the Court
was imposing a "federal remedy for violations of the standard.128 1
In conclusion, Harlan stated that there was no true majority behind the
Court's opinion.
[I]t should be noted that the majority opinion in this case is in
fact an opinion only for the judgment overruling Wolf, and not
for the basic rationale by which four members of the majority
have reached that result. For my Brother Black is unwilling to
subscribe to their view that the Weeks exclusionary rule derives
from the Fourth Amendment itself, . . . but joins the majority
opinion on the premise that its end result can be achieved by
bringing the Fifth Amendment to the aid of the Fourth...
Two years later, in Ker v. California ,283 the Court declared that fourth
amendment standards of reasonableness govern state searches and sei-
zures. Justice Harlan again emphasized the difference between federal
and local law enforcement problems, stating that the states "should not
be put in a constitutional strait jacket." 284 He went on to warn that
if the Court is prepared to relax Fourth Amendment standards in
order to avoid unduly fettering the States, this would be in
derogation of law enforcement standards in the federal sys-
tem-unless the Fourth Amendment is to mean one thing for the
States and something else for the Federal Government. 285
Harlan repeated this warning over the years and professed to see it come
true.
286
280. Id. at 679.
281. Id. at 680.
282. Id. at 685 (footnote omitted).
283. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
284. Id. at 45 (Harlan, J., concurring).
285. Id. at 45-46.
286. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490-92 (1971) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 769-70 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring). In
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G. The Fourth Amendment Reborn
Mapp marked the beginning of a new era in the Court's interpretation
of the fourth amendment. The same Term that Mapp was decided, the
Court took a step toward freeing the amendment from the technical
property law concepts of trespass and possessory right in the items
seized. In Silverman v. United States,287 an electronic surveillance case,
the Court declared that a federal court should not admit evidence ob-
tained by a listening device driven into a wall from an adjoining building.
Distinguishing an earlier case 288 on the ground that there had been no
actual physical invasion of the premises, the Court found it unnecessary
"to consider whether or not there was a technical trespass under the
local property law relating to party walls. Inherent Fourth Amendment
rights are not inevitably measurable in terms of ancient niceties of tort or
real property law." 289 Six years later, in Katz v. United States ,29 the
Court held that the amendment protected personal privacy rights from
government intrusion regardless of place or circumstances. 291 Katz's
implications went far beyond the electronic surveillance context, 292 and
Coolidge, Justice Harlan concluded that "in order to leave some room for the States to
cope with their own diverse problems, there has been generated a tendency to relax
federal requirements under the Fourth Amendment, which now govern state procedures
as well." 403 U.S. at 491.
287. 365 U.S. 505 (1%1).
288. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). In Goldman, a majority of the
Court was unwilling to overrule Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), and hold
that the placing of a detectaphone against the wall of a private office was not a trespass
and, therefore, not a search. The Silverman Court distinguished, for fourth amendment
purposes, between the intrusion via means of the spike mike in the case before it and the
usage of the detectaphone in Goldman, labelling the former "an unauthorized physical
encroachment within a constitutionally protected area." 365 U.S. at 510. This strained
distinction was later obliterated in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
289. 365 U.S. at 511 (footnote omitted). This language by Justice Stewart clearly
foreshadowed his opinion for the Court in Katz v. United States.
290. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
291. In his definitive article on the fourth amendment, Professor Anthony G. Amster-
dam attributed great importance to the Katz decision, characterizing it as "a watershed in
fourth amendment jurisprudence." Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 382 (1974). However, Amsterdam concludes, Katz has lost its
spirit and much of its substance by general judicial acceptance of the formula that
"wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable 'expectation of privacy,'.., he is
entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Id. at 383 quoting Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). As Amsterdam points out, the phrase "reasonable expectation
of privacy" was excerpted from Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz, 389 U.S. at 360
(Harlan, J., concurring), a formulation about which Justice Harlan himself later expressed
reservations. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971). The true meaning of
Katz, Amsterdam suggests, is not that we have some malleable, subjective expectation of
privacy, but irreducible interests or rights that the fourth amendment protects. See
Amsterdam, supra, at 385.
292. While Katz may have fallen short of the potential Amsterdam envisioned, it has
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lower courts were given altogether different criteria for determining
whether government surveillance or search activity had violated the
fourth amendment.
Overruling Olmstead, the Katz Court, with only Justice Black dissent-
ing, held that the fourth amendment was violated by the FBI's use of a
bug attached to the outside of a public telephone booth which enabled an
agent to pick up a gambler's telephone calls:
For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected . . . .To read
the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the
public telephone has come to play in private communication.2 93
The Court declared that not only was the amendment freed from proper-
ty law concepts, it was also freed from any interpretation that would
limit it to the kinds of abuses in the minds of the people who wrote and
adopted it. The amendment was a standard of protection which would
apply to any form of government surveillance or intrusion violating the
interest protected by it.
In the years immediately preceding and following Katz, the Court was
also struggling to give some content to the term "probable cause"-a
search requirement that had been assumed in many of the Court's deci-
sions but which had received relatively little considered analysis. In a
series of cases involving both state and federal officers, the Court
formulated a fairly stringent "two-prong" test for the reliability and
sufficiency of information obtained from informers. 294 This test was
spelled out elaborately in Justice Harlan's opinion for a five-justice
majority in Spinelli v. United States.295 In Spinelli, the Court reversed a
holding by the en banc Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that a
detailed affidavit by an FBI agent about a gambling suspect's activities
had furnished probable cause for a search warrant. 2% The Spinelli deci-
dramatically altered and expanded the concept of what constitutes a government search
and what is therefore subject to the fourth amendment. Literally hundreds of state and
lower court decisions have scrutinized a wide variety of governmental search or surveil-
lance techniques under the Katz standard, however watered-down it may have become.
293. 389 U.S. at 351-52 (citation omitted).
294. The leading cases on this point were Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410(1969)
and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). See also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
295. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
296. 382 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1967). The five-three Spinelli majority in the Supreme Court
was a tenuous one, resting as it did on Justice White's rather unusual concurrence. After
explaining exhaustively the reasons for his belief that the reasoning of the Court's opinion
in Spinelli was inconsistent with Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), he joined
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sion stressed that intrusions upon the interest specified in Katz were not
to be made lightly; the term "probable cause" was a demanding stan-
dard, not to be supported by such flimsy considerations as the word of an
informer of unproven reliability, the suspect's reputation, or a recount-
ing, however detailed, of activity as consistent with innocence as with
guilt.
A strong sense of the fourth amendment's purpose underlay the
Court's later decision in Chimel v. California297 which plugged the gaping
hole in the warrant requirement left exposed by Rabinowitz. Justice
Stewart's opinion for the Chimel majority was significant in three re-
spects. First, the facts of that case-a roving search of an entire house
"incident" to a defendant's arrest in the living room-was a good indica-
tion of how broad the most commonly invoked exception to the warrant
requirement had become. Second, the Court explicitly eschewed an
opportunity merely to distinguish Rabinowitz298 and Harris on their
facts; it held that the permissible range for such a search was limited to
the area immediately surrounding the arrested person, into which he
might be able to reach to obtain a weapon or conceal or destroy evi-
dence. 299 Third, the term "reasonable" was rescued from its usage in
Rabinowitz, which was described by Stewart as "little more than a'
subjective view regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of police
conduct, and not on considerations relevant to Fourth Amendment inter-
ests."300 Stewart maintained that the term "reasonable" must be tied to
"some criterion of reason . . .; the test is the reason underlying and
expressed by the Fourth Amendment: the history and the experience
which it embodies and the safeguards afforded by it against the evils to
which it was a response." 301
The Court's new dedication to privacy interests was also reflected in
several other opinions concerning such issues as the need for health and
fire inspectors to obtain consent or a warrant of some kind before
searching a home or business, 302 the constitutional limitations on the
"the opinion of the Court and the judgment of reversal, especially since a vote to affirm
would produce an equally divided Court." 393 U.S. 410, 429 (White, J., concurring).
297. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
298. The California Supreme Court's Chimel opinion did not actually cite Rabinowitz,
but upheld this search under an amorphous line of reasoning that the search was "rea-
sonable" and incident to a valid arrest. See People v. Chimel, 67 Cal. Rptr. 421, 424, 439
P.2d 333, 337 (1968).
299. 395 U.S. at 766 (1%9).
300. Id. at 764-65.
301. Id. at 765, quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 83 (1950) (Frankfur-
ter, J., dissenting).
302. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387
U.S. 541 (1967).
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power of state and federal officials to engage in electronic surveil-
lance, 303 and the existence of a civil cause of action against federal
officers for allegedly violating a plaintiff's fourth amendment rights. 304 A
particularly significant decision during this period was Davis v. Missis-
sippi3°5 in which the Court held that the fourth amendment's proscription
against unreasonable seizures is violated by "investigatory arrest" sei-
zures and detention of individuals without probable cause. Reversing the
Mississippi rape conviction of a young black who, along with virtually
every other young black male in the community, was fingerprinted while
detained without probable cause, the Court warned:
Investigatory seizures would subject unlimited numbers of inno-
cent persons to the harassment and ignominy incident to in-
voluntary detention. Nothing is more clear than that the Fourth
Amendment was meant to prevent wholesale intrusions upon
the personal security of our citizenry, whether these intrusions
be termed "arrests" or "investigatory detentions." 306
The Court did acknowledge, however, that detention for fingerprinting
may, because of the nature and reliability of fingerprinting as a method
of identification, "constitute a much less serious intrusion upon personal
security than other types of police searches and detentions. " 307
H. Mapp's Legacy-The New Accommodation
While it was breathing new life into the fourth amendment, the Court
also was taking the amendment into new territory. Mapp v. Ohio made it
necessary to consider search and seizure activities peculiar to state and
local law enforcement officers whose interests and needs differ from
those of their federal counterparts. As the cases reviewed here indicate,
the law enforcement practices that the Court had reviewed in federal
cases followed certain rather well-defined patterns: the search and sei-
zure typically came at the climax of an investigation, the intrusive
activity was usually planned, or at least could be anticipated ahead of
time, and, to an extent varying from case to case, the government had
some control over the circumstances of the search or seizure. These
cases reflect the type of law enforcement responsibilities borne by feder-
al agents. Entrusted with the apprehension of a limited number of sus-
303. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967).
.304. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
305. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
306. Id. at 726-27.
307. Id. at 727. The Court did leave open the door to a possible approval of limited
detentions for the purpose of fingerprinting suspects for whom there is not probable cause
to arrest, a substantial accommodation with law enforcement interests. Id. at 728.
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pects who violate certain specific statutes outlawing specified kinds of
conduct, they operate with a degree of relative leisure. Since the kinds of
criminal activity they investigate are frequently ongoing and organized,
they generally have anywhere from a few hours to several months to
prepare for a given arrest or search.
No such generalizations can be made about state or local law enforce-
ment officials. The cases decided by the Court in the wake of the Mapp
decision exemplify the wide range of situations in which officers at these
levels must operate. 3°0 Some state agencies and some specialized big-city
units may resemble federal agencies in their operations, but even these
agencies are apt to deal with different types of crimes than their federal
counterparts, confronting criminal activity on a different scale, with
much less opportunity for planned investigations. Their resources must
be spread thinner, and the volume of crime with which they must deal is
greater. In short, they are more likely to engage in "reactive" law
enforcement.
"Reactive" law enforcement describes the type of activities perform-
ed by the vast majority of local law enforcement officers, whether New
York City patrolmen or deputy sheriffs patrolling the wilds of San
Bernardino County. A local officer sees suspicious activity or receives a
bulletin about a crime that has just been committed nearby, and must
respond at once, without time for reflection or consultation. For fourth
amendment purposes, there is a world of difference between this type of
reactive activity and the typical federal investigation. Prior to Mapp, the
Court's interpretations of the fourth amendment needed only to accom-
modate one kind of law enforcement intrusion-that which is the result
of a fairly structured investigation. When the Court held that state and
local practices were also governed by the exclusionary rule, it thus
applied constitutional standards developed for one type of government
conduct to endlessly various and altogether different forms of law en-
forcement. The Court removed the fourth amendment from the garden to
the jungle; the Harlan prophecy was not long in coming true.
The stresses and strains that Justice Harlan had foreseen in Mapp and
Ker were evident. The Court attempted to resolve the tensions between
police practices and the reinvigorated fourth amendment demands with
the same sensitivity to fourth amendment values it demonstrated in
decisions such as Katz, Spinelli, and Chimel. At the same time, howev-
er, the Court found it necessary to modify traditional requirements of the
amendment to accommodate what it perceived to be reasonable police
needs. In so doing, it weakened several limitations on government search
308. See generally, D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY, at 227-37 (1977).
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and seizure authority. In each of those decisions, a majority of the Court
found it necessary to breach what had previously been a solid fourth
amendment wall. For example, in Schmerber v. California,3°9 the Court
was called upon to consider the application of the fourth amendment and
its exclusionary rule to a type of law enforcement activity exclusively
within the province of state and local police-the withdrawal of blood
from a motorist in order to determine his blood alcohol content. Al-
though this type of intrusion is clearly within the fourth amendments
prohibition, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, held this practice
permissible.3 1° The officer who directed the physician to withdraw the
blood sample did so incident to the defendant's arrest for drunken
driving. The arrest was based on probable cause, and the evidence
sought would have disappeared within a very short period of time. The
intrusion and blood withdrawal were performed according to prescribed
medical procedures. The Court also held that neither the defendant's
right to counsel nor his privilege against self-incrimination, which had
just been applied to police interrogations in Miranda v. Arizona,31' was
implicated in this case.312
Schmerber is significant to our analysis in the following respects.
First, the Court approved a law enforcement search that had as its sole
purpose the gathering of evidence for use in a criminal prosecution.
While the searches and seizures considered by the Court over the years
following Weeks were also motivated by a desire to gather evidence, the
evidence sought was generally contraband, the fruits or instrumentalities
of the crime, or items in which the government had a possessory right
superior to that of the defendant. The mere evidence rule doubtless was
partly responsible for this common pattern, but so also was the nature of
federal police work-enforcement of laws which were either essentially
regulatory in nature or aimed at the proceeds of thefts or robberies with
federal implications. State prosecutions were much more likely to raise
questions about the search for and seizure of evidence in which the
governmental interest was purely for use in a prosecution. Second, the
Court's holding that fifth amendment interests were not implicated in the
compelled production of non-testimonial evidence to be used against a
person marked the beginning of the Court's departure from the fourth-
fifth amendment interrelationship view of Boyd v. United States,313 and
309. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
310. In Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), a pre-Mapp case, the Court had held
that a similar police-requested extraction of blood did not offend the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause.
311. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
312. 384 U.S. at 765-66.
313. The Schmerber majority acknowledged that the "values protected by the Fourth
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this distinction provoked vigorous dissents from four members of the
Court. 314 Third, and most significantly, it appears that the Court's rea-
soning in Schmerber was influenced heavily by its concern with the
demands o' reactive police activity peculiar to state and local law en-
forcement. .*
Further changes in the fourth amendment announced in the context of
state searches and seizures came the next term in Warden v. Hayden,
316
another opinion written by Justice Brennan. In Hayden, the Court up-
held a Baltimore police officer's warrantless entry of a private home in
pursuit of a fleeing armed robbery suspect.3 17 The Court also upheld the
officer's search of certain places inside the home-the washing machine,
the flush tank of a commode, and two places in the bedroom where they
found the suspect feigning sleep. These searches occurred either before
or at about the same time the suspect was apprehended. The washing
machine yielded clothes meeting the description of clothes worn by the
robber. A sawed-off shotgun and a pistol were found in the flush tank,
and ammunition was discovered in the bedroom. Holding that all of this
evidence was admissible in Hayden's state prosecution, the Court made
two significant changes in fourth amendment law. First, it abolished the
prohibition, announced in Gouled, against prosecutorial use of mere
evidence obtained in a government search or seizure. 318 Second, it
created a new "hot pursuit" exception to the fourth amendment's war-
rant requirement. 3
19
The Court's decision to abolish the distinction between mere evidence
and contraband or fruits and instrumentalities of crime was a sound one.
Amendment thus substantially overlap those the Fifth Amendment helps to protect." Id.
at 767. But the majority stated that the overlap did not extend to the administration of a
blood test.
314. Id. at 772 (Warren, C.J., dissenting); id. at 773 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 778
(Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 779 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
315. These considerations were developed by Justice Brennan, who along with Justice
Marshall, has dissented in virtually every Court decision over the past five years which
can be counted as "rolling back" fourth amendment rights. As noted by one commen-
tator, Justice Brennan has now taken the lead in calling for the state courts to impose more
stringent standards under the state constitutions than are required by the Supreme Court
under the Federal Constitution. See Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in
the Days of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 874 874-75 (1976). See also Brennan, State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
316. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
317. The defendant had the bad judgment to hold up a Yellow Cab dispatch office and
then flee the scene of his crime on foot. His progress was discreetly monitored by a pair of
Yellow Cabs, then by several police cars.
318. Id. at 310. Significantly, the Court found its holding here foreshadowed by
Schmerber. Id. at 306-07.
319. Id. at 298-300. The term "hot pursuit" was not actually used by Justice Brennan,
but the exception to the warrant requirement carved out here has come to be known as the
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Not only was the distinction unsupported by the language of the fourth
amendment; 320 it had become irrational. As originally formulated in
Gouled, it rested on the property law concept of the defendant's superior
right to property in which the government had no interest except for use
as evidence. The Hayden opinion noted that "[t]he premise that property
interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has
been discredited,""32 and warned that the government's superior com-
mon law property right would not preclude a finding that a given search
or seizure was unreasonable. Anticipating the Court's decision the fol-
lowing term in Katz v. United States, Justice Brennan emphasized the
Court's recognition, enunciated in Jones v. United States322 and Silver-
man v. United States,323 that "the principal object of the Fourth Amend-
ment is the protection of privacy rather than property." 324 Privacy inter-
ests are not really protected by the mere evidence rule, for privacy may
be more seriously invaded by a search for evidence described as an
instrumentality of crime than by a search for items characterized as mere
evidence. Moreover, the mere evidence rule is no longer necessary to
protect fourth amendment rights since other protections such as the
remedy of suppression, the freeing of the availability of this remedy
from property law concepts, and the extension of the remedy to intang-
ible evidence now adequately serve this purpose.
In Hayden, the Court also recognized a new exception to the warrant
requirement in order to accommodate reactive law enforcement inter-
"hot pursuit" exception in subsequent cases. See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427
U.S. 383 (1976).
320. The "right of the people" to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures
"is certainly unrelated to the 'mere evidence' limitation," Justice Brennan emphasized,
387 U.S. at 301; "Privacy is disturbed no more by a search directed to a purely evidentiary
object than it is by a search directed to an instrumentality, fruit, or contraband." Id. at
301-02. This observation is true as far as it goes. However, it does not answer the question
whether the mere evidence rule might have provided the people with additional protection
by serving as a check on the number of improper law enforcement searches. In other
words, might not agents be less likely to search at all for papers or effects that constitute
mere evidence if they knew these items, and other evidence discovered as a result of their
seizure, would be inadmissible in a subsequent prosecution? To this extent, see the
opinion of Justice Fortas in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 311-12 (1967) (Fortas, J.,
concurring), emphasizing the rule's value as a deterrent against general searches. He
would have expanded exceptions to the rule rather than "drive an enormous and danger-
ous hole in the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 312.
321. Id. at 304. It might be asked, however, whether recognition of a person's property
rights in items other than contraband or fruits and instrumentalities does not afford the
people a bulwark against governmental intrusion in addition to the privacy rights or
expectations described by Justice Brennan here and later by Justice Stewart in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1%7).
322. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
323. 365 U.S. 505 (1%1).
324. 387 U.S. at 304.
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ests: the right of the police in pursuit of a fleeing felony suspect to enter a
dwelling without a warrant and to conduct warrantless searches, "the
permissible scope" of which must "at the least, be as broad as may
reasonably be necessary to prevent the dangers that the suspect at large
in the house may resist or escape." 325 The Court expressly refrained
from relying on what was then the very broad incident-to-arrest excep-
tion to the warrant requirement recognized in Rabinowitz and other
fairly recent decisions, but stated that the police could conduct searches
for weapons in places where a suspect obviously could not be hiding.
326
Further accommodation between state law enforcement needs and
fourth amendment rights emerged from the Court's famous "stop and
frisk" decision in Terry v. Ohio, 327 announced the following Term. This
was the Court's first attempt to reconcile the broad language of the
fourth amendment with a form of everyday, "low visibility" police
activity that was then peculiar to law enforcement at the local level. 328
The police practice of stopping a suspicious person on the street and
subjecting him to a patdown for weapons was new to the federal
courts.
32 9
325. Id. at 299.
326. Id. at 299-300. Justice Brennan found it clear from the record that the defendant
had been captured at the time the weapons were found. See id. at 300 n.5.
327. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry was accompanied by a companion case, Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), in which the Court held that heroin seized from Sibron by a
police officer who had observed him speaking with several known addicts was inadmiss-
ible, because the officer had no reason to believe Sibron was armed and dangerous, and
had not "patted down" Sibron for weapons before he took the heroin from Sibron's
pocket. In Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), a case merged for decision with
Sibron, the Court held that a search was legal and the fruits of that search admissible as
evidence at trial. The search took place when an off-duty officer, aroused by Peters'
furtive activities in the officer's apartment building, stopped Peters, frisked him for
weapons, and discovered burglar's tools.
328. For a pre-Terry discussion of "stop and frisk" activity, see Remington, The Law
Relating to "On the Street" Detention, Questioning and Frisking of Suspicious Persons
and Police Arrest Privileges in General, 51 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 386, 389-92 (1960). See
also Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of Arrest? 51 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 402, 403-05 (1960); Wilson, Police Arrest Privileges in a Free Society: A
Plea for Modernization, 51 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 395, 397-99 (1960). Several other states
had enacted "stop and frisk" laws authorizing officers to do essentially what the officers
did in Terry. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 140.50 (McKinney 1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 12-7-1 (1956); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 594, § 2 (1955); DEL. CODE tit. 11 § 1902 (1953).
See also Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315 (1942). Perhaps these laws
were a legislative response to Mapp. See D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY
(1977).
329. See United States v. Mitchell, 179 F. Supp. 636 (D.D.C. 1959), a pre-Mapp
federal case arising out of a District of Columbia policeman's detention of a theft suspect.
(Felony prosecutions for local offenses were then prosecuted in federal court in the
District of Columbia). The court held that this detention was an arrest, and invalid for
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Confronted on one hand with state arguments that this "stop and
frisk" was not covered by the fourth amendment at all,330 and, on the
other, by assertions of civil libertarians that this practice was inevitably
illegal because it was unsupported by probable cause,33' the Court played
Solomon. In fact, Chief Justice Warren went Solomon one better and
followed through by actually bifurcating the fourth amendment 3 2 One
part was what the Court termed the "warrant clause" and the other the
"reasonableness" requirement. The "warrant clause," the Court said,
sets standards that must be satisfied in full-fledged searches and seizures
(the only kind recognized by the Court up until that time). Such a search
must be supported by probable cause, as the warrant clause expressly
demands. But a stop and frisk is not this type of search; it need only
satisfy the more flexible "reasonableness" requirement.
To determine whether a search or seizure satisfies the reasonableness
requirement, the Court developed a "balancing" test; the degree of
government intrusion must be balanced against the legitimate govern-
ment interest it serves-in this case, the investigation of crime and the
protection of the officer and the public. 333 The degree of cause necessary
for such a search is not the stringent probable cause standard, but is
substantially less in light of the limited purpose and degree of the intru-
sion. Thus was born the reasonable or articulable suspicion standard for
determining the validity of a stop and frisk. 334
Chief Justice Warren was frank in admitting the reason for this bifur-
cation of the amendment, which Justice Douglas scored as a step without
precedent and at odds with fourth amendment history.3 35 The exclusion-
ary rule, the Chief Justice explained,
has its limitations . . . as a tool of judicial control. . . . [i]t is
powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed
rights where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or
want of probable cause. But see United States v. Bonnano, 180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y.
1960), in which Judge Kaufman of the Southern District of New York came to the
opposite conclusion about a joint state-federal roadblock at the famed 1957 "mob"
meeting in Apalachin, New York. This case presented a fact situation which, unlike the
District of Columbia case, can hardly be described as a "typical" stop and frisk.
330. 392 U.S. at 10-11.
331. Id. at 11-12. See also Amsterdam, supra note 291, at 394-95.
332. The Court rejected the notion that the fourth amendment did not cover situations,
such as the one presented, in which a "full blown" search had not occurred. 392 U.S. at
19. At the same time, it recognized the necessity for swift police action in hot pursuit
situations. Id. at 20.
333. Id. at 20-27.
334. The actual phrase "articulable suspicion less than probable cause" was coined by
Justice Harlan in his concurrence. See id. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
335. See id. at 35-39 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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are willing to forego successful prosecution in the interest of
serving some other goal.
Proper adjudication of the cases in which the exclusionary
rule is invoked demands a constant awareness of these limita-
tions.336
Central to this observation was a shift in the Court's perception of the
exclusionary rule. In Linkletter v. Walker,337 the Court had grappled with
the problem of whether Mapp should apply retroactively. In holding that
Mapp would only apply prospectively, the Court explained that the
primary purpose of Mapp was the deterrence of future police lawless-
ness. In Terry, the Court reiterated the exclusionary rule's importance as
necessary to preserve judicial integrity, 338 but described "its major
thrust" as "a deterrent one." 3
39
The Court's discussion of the exclusionary rule's inadequacy as a
deterrent against certain kinds of police tactics dealt with the type of
conduct which, unlike the aims of federal officers, has a law enforce-
ment aim other than the simple procurement of a conviction. Indeed, the
Court's rationale for recognizing a limited authority to search and seize
on less than probable cause was spawned by the needs of the officer on
the street rather than the federal agent or special unit officer involved in
specialized crime investigations. The Court's effort to accommodate the
interests of the local officer led it to phrase the issue as "the reasonable-
ness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a
citizen's personal security." 34 Chief Justice Warren had already noted
that "[n]o judicial opinion can comprehend the protean variety of the
street encounter, and we can only judge the facts of the case before
us."-341 Here, the Court could do no more than decide whether "it was
reasonable for officer McFadden to have interfered with petitioner's
personal security as he did" 342 at the time the search occurred.
Thus, the way was cleared for courts to evaluate similar law enforce-
ment intrusions in light of a "reasonableness" test which, by its very
336. Id. at 13-14.
337. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
338. 392 U.S. at 12.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 19. Throughout the opinion the Court stressed that it was accommodating
the law enforcement need to react to more or less unexpected, rapidly unfolding events on
the street. See, for example, the Court's description of the kinds of conduct for which the
exclusionary rule has limited value, id. at 13-15; and its reference to "necessarily swift
action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer in the heit-which
historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant
procedure." Id. at 20.
341. Id. at 15.
342. Id. at 19.
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terms, could not be precisely formulated or limited in its application.
Such a test would be applied regardless of the intruding officer's initial
motivation or source of information, or the nature of the crime being
investigated.3 43 Furthermore, the sliding-scale balancing test for evaluat-
ing the reasonableness of a police intrusion has led to approval of lesser
intrusions on the basis of a considerably lesser degree of suspicion than
McFadden's 344 All of this may make sense as applied to officers who are
engaged in preventive police work. Whether it makes sense in the setting
of aggressive federal investigative practices is another matter. Unfortu-
nately, despite Warren's preoccupation in Terry with police activity in a
street context, nothing in the opinion limits "stop and frisk" authority to
the street context, or prevents its use in far different types of law
enforcement practices, federal as well as state.
Schmerber, Hayden, and Terry are milestones in the development of
the fourth amendment. In both Schmerber and Hayden, the Court elimi-
nated barriers that it had earlier erected against federal practices found
intolerable under the fourth amendment. In Hayden, the Court also
carved out a new exception to the warrant requirement, 345 and although
the "hot pursuit" exception was a limited one, the Court's formulation
of it was. not. In the years since, state and lower federal courts have felt
free to recognize variations to the "hot pursuit" theme, so that today
there exists a broad and amorphous "emergency" exception to the
general requirement that a warrant must be obtained before officials can
enter a home for the purpose of crime prevention or evidence-gather-
ing. 346 Of these three cases, Terry was the most obvious effort by the
Court to refine the fourth amendment in order to accommodate state
interests. Nevertheless, all three cases indicated that the Court was
concerned with the need to accommodate state and local law enforce-
343. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 488 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1973), in which an FBI
agent stopped an automobile to question an occupant about certain suspected federal
fugitives, then seized evidence of a Draft Act violation that came to his attention during
the detention. See also United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973); United States v.
Catalano, 450 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Moscatello v. United States,
405 U.S. 928; White v. United States, 448 F.2d 250 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
926 (1972); People v. Cruz, 186 Colo. 295, 526 P.2d 1315 (1974); notes 350-52 &
accompanying text infra.
344. See People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 352 N.E.2d 562, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1976).
In Lawson v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 354, 228 S.E.2d 685 (1976), the Virginia Supreme
Court permitted a simple stop without a frisk (which in DeBour promptly followed the
stop) upon less than the degree of suspicion demanded by Terry and Adams.
345. 387 U.S. at 298-300.
346. See, e.g., United States v. Curran, 498 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Davis, 461 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Doyle, 456 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Pino, 431 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 989 (1971).
[Vol. 27:9
Decline of the Fourth Amendment
ment interests, and each case expanded the permissible range of certain
law enforcement conduct.
These accommodations were made without any distinction between
what is permitted state officers and federal agents-indeed, such a
distinction may have been foreclosed when the Court stated in Ker v.
California that federal and state officials were governed by the same
fourth amendment standards.347 Accordingly, the techniques which the
Court sanctioned in these cases, all of which were employed in response
to unanticipated situations, were now available to all law enforcement
agents, whatever their mission and however they may have arrived at the
point where their situation was superficially similar to those described in
Schmerber, Hayden, or Terry. State and federal agents involved in
aggressive, specialized crime investigation, especially drug agents, have
not hesitated to take advantage of these and subsequent decisions. Two
types of cases illustrate this point. One is the warrantless entry of a home
or search of an immobilized automobile to seize drugs. 3" This type of
search is conducted not in response to an unanticipated emergency, but
as the climax of an extended investigation, usually performed with the
help of informers and undercover agents. The agents' excuse for dis-
pensing with a warrant in these cases is that when they learn the location
of the drugs and decide to make their move, they do not have the
opportunity to obtain a warrant without delaying the search and risking
the disappearance of the contraband. 349
A second technique which appears to be utilized most frequently by
Drug Enforcement Administration Agents is the "airport stop."350 This
is a kind of bootstrap operation, whereby agents can parlay their initial
suspicion in a deplaning passenger into searches of the person, his
347. See 374 U.S. 23 (1962).
348. See note 346 supra; see also United States v. Mitchell, 538 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir..
1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977); United States v. Sigal, 500 F.2d 1118
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 954 (1974); United States v. Soriano, 497 F.2d 147 (5th
Cir. 1974).
349. This practice has been condemned when a court has decided that there was ample
time to obtain the warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Scheffer, 463 F.2d 567 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 984 (1972); United States v. Niro, 388 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1968). But
see United States v. Mitchell, 538 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 945 (1977); United States v. Curran, 498 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1974).
350. Most of these cases have come from the Eastern District of Michigan and involve
Drug Enforcement Administration Agents' use of a "drug courier profile" (inspired by the
"hijacker profiles" utilized by airlines and federal officials to combat the hijacking rash of
the early 1970's). See, e.g., United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Mich.
1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717 (6th Cir.
1977); United States v. Chamblis, 425 F. Supp. 1330 (E. D. Mich. 1977); United States v.
Floyd, 418 F. Supp. 724 (E. D. Mich. 1976). However, similar methods are apparently
used elsewhere, see, e.g., United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977).
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luggage, and even a car waiting outside the airport. The agents scrutinize
flights from cities that are known to be drug distribution centers. An
agent approaches a passenger whom he suspects of being a drug courier
but does not have probable cause to arrest. The agent's source of
information may be rather strong, possibly including a host of details
about this person's travel pattern, associates, and criminal record.35" ' On
the other hand, the agent may act merely because the suspect meets the
DEA's "drug courier" profile and acts in a nervous manner which
arouses the agent's suspicion. The agent will approach the person, ask
for identification, and wait for the person to answer or react in a manner
which transforms his suspicion into what a court is later willing to
recognize as probable cause. 352
It seems beyond argument that police officers suddenly and unexpect-
edly confronted with the need to act without a warrant in order to save
lives, apprehend a dangerous felon, or neutralize a potentially dangerous
suspect should not be hamstrung by the fourth amendment's exclusion-
ary rule. Although it may be difficult to assert that investigative agents
confronted with such exigent circumstances should be treated any differ-
ently under the fourth amendment, it must be remembered that the two
situations are not the same. A police failure to respond in Schmerber
would have meant that the case would have been irretrievably lost. A
failure to respond at once in Hayden or Terry could have proved cata-
strophic; in each case there was a great and immediate threat of violent
criminal conduct. No such threat of immediate and irreparable threat to
individuals or the public exists, however, when drug agents delay a
search in order to get a warrant. In each of these cases, the agents have
an alternative open to them-further surveillance until a warrant can be
obtained.3 53 The risk of a loss of contraband or the temporary escape of
the suspect is precisely the type of risk that the fourth amendment has
traditionally required. And it should be kept in mind that the cases
described here put the exclusionary rule in its least favorable light-the
protection of the guilty. Cases arising out of criminal prosecutions tell us
nothing about intrusive law enforcement conduct directed at the inno-
cent.
What might be described as fourth amendment slippage-the weaken-
ing of the amendment resulting from the Court's initial efforts to accom-
modate state interests-is not, of course, confined to lower court deci-
351. See United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535 (E. D. Mich. 1976), aff'd, 556
F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977).
352. See id. at 538-40.
353. Compare the cases cited in notes 346-349 supra with United States v. Johnson,
561 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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sions countenancing aggressive law enforcement techniques. Many of
the Supreme Court's decisions over the past five terms have weakened
the amendment even more than the lower federal courts and some states
have been willing to do. Although the Adams, Miller, Santana, and
Bustamonte decisions, follow logically from the Court's opinions in
Schmerber, Hayden, and Terry, it is clear that the majority opinions in
these more recent cases do not reflect the high degree of sensitivity to
fourth amendment values which animated the majority opinions in
Schmerber, Hayden, and Terry. 354 In light of the course taken in these
cases, the question is not whether the fourth amendment must be diluted
in order to accommodate state interests, but how much it is to be diluted.
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A MODEST SUGGESTION
It is possible to analyze all the Court's fourth amendment decisions on
a continuum, much like a pendulum swinging between periods of restric-
tive and broad interpretation of the amendment. Each decision since
Boyd can be observed as one part of a recurring pattern in the age-old
struggle between individual and governmental interests. Whenever con-
fronted with a new or increasingly aggressive form of intrusive law
enforcement activity, the Court has responded with a landmark decision
broadly applying the fourth amendment either to limit or to end that
activity. Later; over a period of decades, it will modify that strong stand
by refining away much of the force of its initial pronouncements as it
gives greater weight to asserted governmental interests served by that
activity. Then, as the government takes greater advantage of the Court's
late-blossoming effort accomodation or develops new kinds of intrusive
practices, the Court will again interpret the amendment in a broad man-
ner to halt the government's overarching law enforcement efforts.
The Court's original strong stand was taken in 1886 in Boyd v. United
States355 and was followed by a period of accommodation that lasted
until the Court's adoption of the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United
States356 in 1914. Weeks and two other cases decided in the ensuing
seven years, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States357 and Gouled v.
United States,35 marked the second high point in the fourth amend-
ment's history. These cases were followed by a long period of accomo-
dation and, eventually, capitulation to governmental interests in the late
354. See, e.g., Justice Marshall's dissenting opinions in United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218, 238 (1972) and Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 153 (1972).
355. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
356. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
357. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
358. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
19771
Catholic University Law Review
1940's and early 1950's. 359 Finally, the 1960's brought the amendment's
third high point, with the broad pronouncements in such decisions as
Mapp v. Ohio,36 Katz v. United States, 361 and Chimel v. California.362
And although the fourth amendment has lately fallen upon hard times, it
is possible to extrapolate that it will be only a matter of time before the
next broad pronouncement will issue forth from the Court.
Unfortunately, this pendulum theory has its weak points. The present
period of accommodation appears to differ markedly from those periods
following Boyd and Weeks. The frequency with which search and sei-
zure decisions are considered by the Court is far greater today than it
was during either of the earlier periods. More significant is the fact that
almost every recent case has arisen out of intrusive conduct by state or
local law enforcement officials rather than federal agents. The reason for
this should be apparent; the Court perceives, correctly or incorrectly,
that the "reactive" state and local law enforcement agencies cannot
effectively coexist with strong fourth amendment protections, and the
inseparability of federal protections from state protection, as mandated
in Mapp v. Ohio, has led to a substantial weakening of all fourth amend-
ment protections, despite the fact that such a dilution is totally unneces-
sary in the federal context. As Justice Harlan foresaw, Mapp has led to
virtually irresolvable tensions between state law enforcement needs and
sound fourth amendment principles. Mapp placed the Court at a cross-
roads in the development of the fourth amendment. Faced with the
choice between placing the states in a constitutional straitjacket and
accommodating the states at the expense of sound fourth amendment
principles, the Court has chosen the path of accommodation. The conse-
quences of this choice may be dismaying, but accepting the fact that the
Court has chosen this particular course, the question now becomes:
"What choices remain open to the Court?"
The first, of course, is to continue down the present path. The Court
has already significantly limited existing protections afforded by the
fourth amendment. It has effectively eliminated lower federal court
review of state search and seizure practices. 363 It could further weaken
the standards that law enforcement officials must satisfy in order to
avoid the exclusionary rule. Chief Justice Burger and Justice White, of
course, would like to substantially limit the exclusionary rule.
359. For a discussion of the trend during this period, see pp. 43-50 supra.
360. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
361. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
362. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
363. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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On the other hand-and this is extremely unlikely in the near future-
the Court could reverse its present direction. It could march back up the
path it has taken, knocking down its own recent precedents and reestab-
lish sound fourth amendment principles, albeit at the expense of local
law enforcement interests. The consequences of such a choice are obvi-
ous: public outcry about penalizing the police and coddling criminals,
increased incentives for police perjury, state court recalcitrance, and a
great degree of judicial confusion. Or the Court could take a less disrup-
tive approach in attempting to reestablish a sound fourth amendment by
opting for a regulatory view of the fourth amendment and the exclusion-
ary rule. 3 4 For example, Professor Anthony Amsterdam envisions a
three-part rule:
(1) Unless a search or seizure is conducted pursuant to and in
conformity with either legislation or police departmental rules
and regulations, it is an unreasonable search and seizure pro-
hibited by the fourth amendment. (2) The legislation or police-
made rules must be reasonably particular in setting forth the
nature of the searches and seizures and the circumstances under
which they should be made. (3) The legislation or rules must, of
course, be conformable with all additional requirements im-
posed by the fourth amendment upon searches and seizures of
the sorts that they authorize. 365
Amsterdam's approach is attractive, but is not without its difficulties,
the foremost of which is the recurring problem that state and local law
enforcement needs are far different from federal concerns and far less
amenable to a single, vigorous standard of judicial review.
A third alternative for the Court, takes the federal/state distinction into
account: the overruling of Mapp itself. At first blush this proposal
sounds drastic, and such a step would doubtless produce its own set of
difficult consequences. But it is far less drastic than the modification of
the Weeks exclusionary rule, which appears to be an increasingly distinct
possibility. More important, the negative consequences of such a ruling
should be more than offset by the opportunity it would afford the Court
to return to sound fourth amendment principles. Most objections to the
overruling of Mapp can be easily answered. One objection is likely to be
stare decisis-Mapp is there, it has been decided, and the constitutional
doctrine on which it is based should not be subjected to tampering. A
second related argument is one of continuity. Mapp is a landmark
decision upon which a generation of constitutional development rests
and it is essential to the uniform, rational further development of the
364. See Amsterdam, supra note 291, at 416-29.
365. Id. at 416-17.
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fourth amendment; furthermore, it is the leading case in the development
of the incorporation doctrine, by virtue of which a host of other federal
constitutional rights have been applied to state criminal justice sys-
tems. a66 But these arguments are rendered less persuasive by several
competing considerations. First, the interests protected by the fourth
amendment were held to be a part of the fourteenth amendment due
process clause in Wolf v. Colorado.3 67 Wolf would not be affected by the
demise of Mapp. The due process clause should still compel state courts
to look to the fourth amendment for applicable search and seizure
standards. Even as they frequently did in the years prior to Mapp and
Wolf, the state courts will look to the Supreme Court for guidance in
determining what those standards are. After all, it was only the exclu-
sionary rule and not the fourth amendment which Mapp made applicable
to the states. 36
It should also be noted that the Mapp holding rests on less than firm
footing. Only four justices joined unequivocally in Justice Clark's opin-
ion for the Court. Clark's plurality and Justice Black's crucial concur-
rence relied heavily on a view of the interrelationship of the fourth and
fifth amendments which was weakened by Schmerber v. California and
Warden v. Hayden and expressly repudiated by the Court last year. 369
Black made it clear that he did not consider the rule constitutionally
mandated and later called for its abolition. 370 Mapp's pragmatic orienta-
tion also renders it particularly vulnerable to reconsideration. Justice
Clark's opinion rested more on practical considerations and the desire to
produce certain results than it did on a developing line of constitutional
doctrine. 371 Insofar as Mapp has not produced these intended results,
and has even led to undesirable consequences, the reasons for its con-
tinued vitality have been substantially weakened.
The argument that the overruling of the exclusionary rule would rein-
troduce chaos to the law of search and seizure overlooks the confusion
that has long attended the Court's attempts to deal with fourth amend-
366. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment right to
counsel applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment); Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962) (eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
applicable to states through fourteenth amendment). From the Gideon decision until the
end of the Court's 1968-69 Term, most of the other protections contained in the Bill of
Rights were applied against the states. Fittingly enough, on the last day of Chief Justice
Warren's tenure, the prohibition against "double jeopardy" was incorporated into the
fourteenth amendment in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
367. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
368. See Amsterdam, supra note 291, at 2133.
369. See text accompanying notes 309-26 supra.
370. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 493-500 (1971) (Black, J., dis-
senting).
371. See text accompanying notes 259-76 supra.
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ment issues. Mapp has only aggravated these difficulties; the Court's
own inability to apply consistent lines of reasoning in search and seizure
cases, especially in recent years, has left the state and lower federal
courts with no clear rationale to apply.3 72 Lower courts are now free to
pick and choose among conflicting doctrines.373
Although Mapp was intended to restore a measure of judicial confor-
mity by tying the states to the federal exclusionary rule, a relatively new
phenomenon threatens to propel the law of search and seizure into a
state of total confusion. While the United States Supreme Court has
been narrowly interpreting federal constitutional protections, a growing
number of state supreme courts have looked to their own state constitu-
tions to impose stricter limitations on governmental authority than those
now required under the Bill of Rights. This trend, called the "new
federalism," 374 has been most pronounced with respect to constitutional
protections involving police activities, particularly searches and sei-
zures. Among these decisions are holdings by the California and Hawaii
Supreme Courts that officers may not take advantage of the search
incident to arrest authority for minor offenses, granted by the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Robinson and Gustafson v.
Florida.37 5 Furthermore, the New Jersey Supreme Court has refused to
follow Schneckloth v. Bustamonte by holding that prosecutors may not
use the "totality of the circumstances" test for determining the voluntar-
372. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), Justice Stewart recounted the
Court's difficulties with the search incident to arrest doctrine. The Court experienced
similar, if less pronounced difficulties with the vehicle searches. See Miles & Wefing. The
Automobile Search and the Fourth Amendment: A Troubled Relationship, 4 SETON HALL
L. REV. 105 (1972).
373. See, e.g., the complaint of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court several
years ago about the hapless confusion engendered by the Court's automobile search
cases. Commonwealth v. Haefeli, 361 Mass. 271, 279 N.E.2d 915 (1972). This confusion
seemed to have cleared when the First Circuit considered this case on federal habeas
corpus review two years later. In light of Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), the rule
for warrantless vehicle searches was seen as more lenient. Haefeli v. Chernoff, 526 F.2d
1314 (1st Cir. 1975).
374. See HOROWITZ, supra note 328, at 220-54. See also Wilkes, More on the New
Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L.J. 873 (1975); Wilkes, The New Federalism in
Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974). For
a more critical view of this phenomenon, see Note, State Constitutional Guarantees as
Adequate State Ground: Supreme Court Review and Problems of Federalism, 13 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 737 (1976).
Justice Brennan has become an outspoken advocate of state courts' exercise of their
prerogatives under their respective state constitutions. See Brennan, State Constitutions
and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
375. See People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099 (1975); State v. Kaluna, 55
Hawaii 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974). See also People v. Kelly, 77 Misc.2d 284, 353 N.Y.S.2d
II1 (Crim. Ct. N.Y.), modified, 79 Misc. 2d 534, 361 N.Y.S.2d 135 (App. Div. 1974).
1977]
Catholic University Law Review
iness of consents to search.3 76 Most ironically, the South Dakota Su-
preme Court, following remand of the Opperman case, invoked the
South Dakota Constitution's search and seizure provision and refused to
permit its police the automobile inventory latitude allowed by the United
States Supreme Court's Opperman decision. 377 The result of all this is
that some of the state law enforcement officers whose interests the
United States Supreme Court has tried to accommodate now may not
take advantage of these decisions, while their federal brethren remain
free to do so. Mapp's objective of high and uniformly enforced national
search and seizure standards has not been achieved. In fact, the ultimate
result produced by Mapp has been precisely the opposite. 378
Moreover, the overruling of Mapp will not necessarily invite fresh
police abuses which state courts will be either unwilling or unable to
control.3 79 Not only does Stone v. Powell already give the state courts the
exclusive right to apply the exclusionary rule to searches and seizures,
but it must be remembered that the most abusive forms of local police
conduct are deterred little, if at all, by the operation of the exclusionary
rule.38 ' Chief Justice Warren recognized this in Terry v. Ohio. 381 The
rule simply does not reach police brutality and harassment, and it un-
doubtedly encourages police perjury. 382 There is no legitimate reason to
presuppose a lack of sensitivity on the part of state supreme courts to
fourth amendment interests. Given the choices of adopting, retaining, or
rejecting exclusionary rules of their own, the state supreme courts un-
doubtedly would respond with a variety of decisions.3 83 There is no
indication that, once freed from the exclusionary rule, the state courts
would make a headlong rush to irresponsibility. As already noted, sever-
al state supreme courts have already reacted to the Supreme Court's
loosening of fourth amendment standards by tightening their own search
and seizure provisions. And if any state were tempted to stray far afield
376. State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975).
377. State v. Opperman, - S.D. - ; 247 N.W.2d 673 (1976).
378. It should also be noted that the standardization of fourth amendment principles
was aided considerably by federal habeas corpus review of state convictions. While the
standardizing force of this device may have been weakened by the Supreme Court's
recent penchant for reversing federal court decisions granting state prisoners habeas
corpus relief on fourth amendment grounds, it was destroyed in Stone v. Powell. Any
oversight of state court interpretations of the fourth amendment must now come from the
Supreme Court itself, which is simply incapable of considering more than a handful of
fourth amendment cases a year.
379. See Amsterdam, supra note 291, at 416-25.
380. See HOROWITZ, supra note 328, at 223-24.
381. 392 U.S. at 14-15.
382. See HOROWITZ, supra note 328, at 234.
383. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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from the search and seizure standards currently in force, the Court
would still have the due process clause sanction as applied in Rochin v.
California.
Moreover, the due process rationale of Wolf will remain. The due
process clause bars the use of evidence in a state trial that is seized in
violation of that standard. However, that standard need not be as rigid
for the states as it is for federal officers who are under the direct
command of the fourth amendment. Thus, while conduct like that of the
officers in Mapp and Rochin would lead to the exclusion of evidence
from a state trial, the conduct of Detective McFadden in Terry v. Ohio
would yield admissible evidence. On the other hand, Detective McFad-
den's technique might not be available to federal drug agents who would
have to answer to a higher standard. There would be no need to sever the
fourth amendment's reasonableness clause from its probable cause re-
quirement insofar as the amendment applies to federal officers. 384
Overruling Mapp admittedly would entail its own problems. Perhaps
the most obvious would arise out of cooperation between federal and
state officers. Officers from different jurisdictions frequently cooperate,
either formally or informally. A question would certainly arise as to
evidence seized by a state officer which led to a federal prosecution.
Similar problems would arise in connection with evidence obtained in a
federal investigation which would prove a state crime or evidence ob-
tained as a result of a joint state-federal investigation. Elkins v. United
States presumably would forbid the introduction in a federal trial of
evidence obtained in a search by state officers that did not satisfy fourth
amendment standards. 385 Whether evidence unconstitutionally obtained
by or in conjunction with federal officers could be used in a state trial
would remain an open question. Certainly it could not if the search and
seizure were so obviously illegal as to raise due process considerations.
The admissibility in a state trial of evidence federally seized in a less
objectionable but nevertheless unconstitutional course of conduct would
be another question, which eventually would require adjudication by the
Supreme Court.
Another possible objection to the modification of Mapp might rest on
the effect that such a decision could have on the host of post-Mapp
decisions applying other Bill of Rights provisions to state prosecutions.
384. Federal law enforcement officers engaged in vigorous crime investigation for at
least 50 years prior to Terry v. Ohio without receiving any general judicial sanction for
searches or seizures of any kind on less than probable cause. See note 328 supra. The
Terry opinion clearly was designed to accommodate local law enforcement interests. See
text accompanying notes 327-42 supra.
385. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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But, as the Supreme Court itself has noted, these other protections rest
on independent grounds, many of them more compelling than the basis
for the exclusionary rule. 386 Most focus on assuring the defendant a fair
trial or protecting him from official harassment at a point well past the
arrest and evidence-gathering stage of a case.3 87 The protections that go
to a suspect's treatment at the hands of the police are enforced by
exclusionary rules developed independently of the fourth amendment.388
The benefits of tinkering with Mapp in this fashion are major. Of
utmost importance is that the Court would be free from the pressure to
adjust fourth amendment standards downward to accommodate the per-
ceived need of state and local law enforcement officials. The Court could
again apply the full force of the amendment to federal law enforcement
officers, whose needs are much more amenable to the broad and liberal
interpretation the amendment should receive. 389 Modifying Mapp would
be a major break with the recent past. It would, however, be a far more
modest step than a modification of the exclusionary rule announced in
Weeks. The roots of that rule go back beyond Weeks, to Boyd itself. The
Supreme Court has never approved the use of illegally seized evidence in
a federal criminal trial for any purpose other than impeachment. Those
who would decry modifying Mapp as a step toward weakening the fourth
amendment might well consider the effect of a modification of the
exclusionary rule itself. The modification of this rule would surely tear
the fabric of the fourth amendment. The alternative suggested here
would not only recognize the differences between federal and non-
federal law enforcement needs but would leave the fourth amendment
essentially intact. In the words of Justice Clark, this alternative could
serve to afford to the individual "no more than that which the Constitu-
tion guarantees him, to the police officer no less than that to which
honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial
integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice." 319
386. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
387. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (protection against double
jeopardy); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1%3) (right to counsel); Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).
388. Mapp v. Ohio played no significant part in the Court's landmark decision in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
389. There would be some significant discrepancies here. The District of Columbia
Metropolitan Police and the United States Park Police, whose missions are similar to local
law enforcement officers throughout the states, would still be bound by the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule. Also, the FBI at times engages in law enforcement that is
more reactive than investigatory in nature.
390. 367 U.S. at 660.
